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INTRODUCTION
Microcredit is a strategic development model that claims to improve the plight of the poor.
Before the introduction of m icrocredit in Bangladesh in 1977, poor people were denied access to
capital

vis-a~vis

siruation.

traditional means such as bank loans The arrival of microcredit changed this

Microlending instirutions issue small loans to poor microentrepreneurs so that they

[microentrepreneurs] can invest the money in their businesses. Loans are given at higher interest
rates than the formal banking sector in order to cover the administrative costs of issuing lots of small
loans. Poor people are willing to pay 'the high interest, however, because although high, interest rates
are much lower than those charged by loan sharks.

As businesses grow and profits increase,

microentrepreneurs are able to pay back their loan. Successful repayment of the loan makes them
eligible to receive another loan, and the process is repeated again and again, with each loan amount
growing proportionately to business produc,tivity. Microcl'edit theory claims that the capital provided
gives the poor the means to pull themselves out of poverty. Furthermore, rnicrocredit theory claims
that as businesse.s grow larger, they create more employment opportunities, which contributes to the
overall national development of a country.
Bolivia has embraced the microcredit model to its fuUest.

Economists and international

actors alike have declared microcredit a phenomenal success.

Targeli;ng the commercial,

manufacturing, and service sectors, microcredit claims to reach the poor that formal ba..nks

~efuse

to

serve. Women were some of the first clients to take advantage of microcredit. We are told that the)'
used it to pursue social ends. That is, with access to credi,t, women chaIlenged traditional patriarchal
hierarchies that have long been reinforced by women's lack of access to capital.

In Bolivia,

microcredit no longer strictly focuses on reaching women but rather it targets men and women alike.
Once the work of small NGOs funded by international investors, microcred.it has expanded
its scope and has become a new competitive financial sector. Microfinance lending institutions have
become financially profitable, commercializing microcredit to the fullest. Reaching clients in every
3

regional department in Bolivia, microfinance institutions offer new services consistent with clientele
demand. Bolivians are lining up outside of microcredit banks to receive loans, and microcredit banks
are expanding to meet clientele demand. Microcredit seems to be a dream come true.
First this study discusses the evolution of economic development models in Bolivia from
1970 to the present day. In the 1970s, Hugo Banzer led an authoritarian regime that favored the
growth of the economy vis-a-vis of state-led industries, also known as state developmental ism. The
state-led industry provided secure jobs and emplo)'TIlent benefits for the poor.

In the late 19705

BanzeT's regime could no longer hold out against national and international pressures for a return to
democratic rule and an opening of the market, which resulted in the decline of state
developmentalism. These transitions prompted the introduction of a new economic plan, known as
neoIiberal,ism. Neoliberal policies had profound effects on Bolivia's class and economic structures.
The liberalization of the market pointed to significant changes in development for the poor. The new
kind of development was the introduction of microcredit by international, non-governmental
organizations. At first microcredit targeted poor peasants in rural Bolivia by providing them with
capi,tal and technical skills needed to start and maintain small businesses. Private investors, however,
rejected rural microcredit because it did not yield profitable returns. Thereafter microcredit efforts
moved to urban centers and the new target population was the urban microentrepreneur.

Quite

distinct from 1970 state developmentalism in which the poor had steady jobs and social welfare
benefits, in the onset 21 51 century development was defined by granting the poor access to
microcredit. These development strategies were motivated by specific political and economic factors.
This study considers what actors supported the various strategic development plans, what economic
and socia.! population each plan targeted, and how this population was affected by changiog
defin~tioJ'1s of development.

Second, this study analyzes the significant changes that have taken place within the
microcredit strategic plan in the past two decades.

Initially non-profit, non-governmental
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organizations (NGOs) implemented the microcredit and defined i,ts ov,eraH "social" and "economic"
mission.

Today nticrocredit has been commercialized, and NGOs play an insignificant role in

micfOcredit activity. The new actors in microcredit, Bolivian businessmen, government technocrats,
and international organizations have defined a new mission that emphasizes the financial viability of
micfofinance institutions. So much is tills the case that tod'ay, the Bolivian government nOw decides
how and to whom a bank can issue a loan. While most scholars of microcredit claim these changes
are insignificant, this smdy argues that such changes are indeed important. In addition this study
indicates that the Bolivian microcredit model bas not achieved its goal of poverty alleviation.
Masked behind questionable theoretical assump.tions, microcredit claims that its economic success
and financial viability inherently mean that its social1 goals of poveIty alleviation are being met lbis
study demonstrates that the Bolivian microcredit model cOllsiders the "social" impact of microcredit
on the poor is of little or no importance. Given iliat profitability is the modeI's only measure of
success, I chalfenge a definition of success that ignores important factors. Microfinance institutions
directly link their own economic success and/or profitability wilh the microentreprenellr's social and
economic development They claim that good banking alleviates poverty. Th'e .assertion, mOTe6ver,
that microcredit gives the microeIltrepreneur an opportunity for social and! economic development is
misleading. The rhetoric '''social and economic development" becomes problematic in trying to
measure the effects of microcredit on the microborrower, because no on.e knows what "development"
looks like.

A similar argument can be made about microcredit as the strategic sustainable

development plan for poverty allevi'ation. Code words such as "sustainable" and "development" are
vague and inadequate for a real discussion about poverty alleviation.

Essentially, development

rhetoric says nothing about the success of the Bolivian poor.
Third, this study not only chanenges the idea mat microcredit is a povertyaneviation strategy
but also ilt points to mict"ocredit as yel another moneymaking scheme of foreign investors. While
nticrocredit theory emphasizes its service to the poor, it is important to see how lenders benefit from
5

microcredit w bile cloaking its true intention behind development rhetoric. I demonstrate that the
benefactors of microcredit are not innocent bystanders performing charitable deeds to help the poor
but rather are capitalists who pursue profit vis-a-vis economic endeavors.
Fourth, I suggest an altemahve definition of microcredit success. While the financial viability
of microfinance insliitutions may point to success, the social and economic indicators such as
increased employment, better education, a reduction in poverty, and overalll ,economic growth do not.
Different from mainstream definitions of success as financial sustainability, my definition considers
the social and economic development of the client as the measure of success. 1 refute microcredit
theory's claim of poveny alleviation. This study illustrates that rather than having reduced poverty,
the Bolivian microcredit model h as allowed some groups top rosper w bile not

0

thers. Untangling

rhetoric from reality, this study seeks to assess the social and economic impact of microcredit on the
microborrower. Accordimg to my definition of success, microcredit does not show significant support
for poverty aHeviatioo_
The study concludes that mjcrocredit theory has been warped from any kind of humanitarian
goall. Theoretically, microcredit is for the poor, but in practice microcredit is for the ricb. The
commercialization of microcredit solidifies this statement because it has placed profitability ahead of
human necessity. In its most benign form, the Bolivian microcredit model is less effective than it
was meant to be. Microcredit advocates bought into the rhetoric of "development" and believed that

it was the answer to poverty. In its most malignant form, microcredit may become hannful for the
poor and the nation, leaving them both in shambles. Microcredit cannot prove poverty alleviation,
microentrepreneur development, or national economic growth.
The structure of this study is as follows: The first chapter describes the origin of microcredit
and the three major lending models. This chapter also includes a description of the motivation of the
study as well as the methodology used. The second chapter illustrates the changes of development
strategies in Bolivia and identifies the motivation behind and significance of each development
6

method.

The third chapter discl!lsses the inforrmal sector, which is the targeted popwlatio,D of

microcredit. This chapter presents several theories about the development of the infonnal sector and
illustrates how politics shape the informal sector in Bolivia.

The fourth chapter is a historical

description of'the foundation of fOUf microfinance institutions: (I) Foundation for the Promotion and
Development of the Microeo,terprise Seeto,r (pRODEM),l (2) Banco Solidario, S.A. 2 (3) Caja de
J

Abono y Prestamo Los Andes (Caja Los Andes)., and (4) Center for the Development of Economic
Initiatives (FiE).) This chapter describes the transformation of NGOs from non-profit microfinance
endeavors to fnr-profit, microfinance institutions and discusses bow this transformation affected the
original mission of microcredit The fifth chapter presents empirical, evidence regarding, the financial
sustainability of the aforementioned microfinance institutions. This chapter also illustrates who are
the real beneficiaries of rnicrocredit. The sixth chapter refutes the data that microctedit profi1abillty
is an adequate indicator of microcredit success and poses a new definition.
substantial evidence that microcredit practices negatively affect the poor.

It also presents
Finally, my study

concludes with a summary of my argument and recommends the further study of microcredit

I

1
J

In Spanish, Fundaci6n para la Promoci6n y Desarrollo de la Microempesa.
In English. Solidarity Bank
In Spanish, Centro de Fomento a Iniciativas Econ6micas.
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CHAPTER ONE:
l1NTRODUCTION TO MICROCREDIT
Origin of Microcredit
MicroCTedi~

was born in the heart of a man who cared. about poor people.

Muhammad

Yunus, an economics professor in Chittagong University in Bangladesh in the early 1970s, was
moved by the starvation of thousands of people when famine when it hit the country. Although the

famine received international attention, the hwnanitarian need was not met and hundreds of people
died daily.

Yunus was disenchanted with the inadequacy of hi education to affect the reality of

poverty. He recalls,
What good were all my complex theories when people were dying of starvation on
the sidewalks and porches across from my lecture hal1? ..Nothing in the economic
theories I taught reflected the life around me. I needed to run away from these
theories and from my textbooks and discover the real-life economics of a poor
person " s eXJstence.4
Yunus was detennined to find a new economic model that would reach the poor. He came to the
conclusion that poor p eaple needed access toe apital and t hat traditional bank methods made this
impossible.. He believed and still believes that "the poor are poor... because they cannot retain the
returns of their labor. They have no control over capital, and it is the ability to control capital that
gives people the power to rise out of poverty... 5 Yunus proposed to alleviate poverty vis-a-vis
microcredi t.

In 1976 Yunus offered his :first clients, all of whom were women, a solidarity group loan-a
loan taken collectively-totaling $30.
successfully repay the loan.

Paying on a weekly basis, the women were able to

With a few adjustments along the way, the Grameen Project was

established and microcredit lending commenced.

Grameen activities expanded quickly and in

• Yunus, Muhammad. 1999. Banker 10 the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty. New York:
Public Affairs. p. viii.
5

Ibid, I41.
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September 1983, the Bangladesh government approved the opening of the Grameen Bank:,
Bangladesh's first formally recognized microlending institution.
Since 1976, microlending has exploded around the world and receives worldwide recognition
as a "successful strategy for sustainable development." Developing nations across the globe have
replicated the Grarneen Bank model, trUsting the microcredit model will yield similar results for them
too. International organizations claim that their- interest in microfinance stems from a desire to reach
as many poor peop'1e as possible. One such organization is USAID, which says its commitment is to
"ensure ,that the poor, wherever they are, share in the benefits of economic growth.,,6 Economic
theorists. international organizations, and scholars promote microlending as the "grand strategy" for:
economic development in developing countries. Today millions of aid dollars are channeled from
bilateral and multil'ateral organizations to nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) that implement the
microcredit model.
Microlending Models
The microcredit model can be applied in several ways. The three most popular lending
models focus on the solidarity group, the individual, and village banking.

Solidarity Group.7 The solidarity group lending model focuses on collectifve respensibi'lliry
regarding a loan. A group of five to ten people come together and decide to take out a loan together,
and each guarantees the payment of the other. In cases where the member cannot make bislher loan
payment then it is the responsibility of the other members in the group to pay on hislber behalf. The
group is self-selected, placing a considerable emphasis on building a social network of support.
Studies have shown that solidarity groups made up of family members are less efficient; so one

~ lJ .S. Agency for International Development. 1999. "Reaching Down and Scaling Up: Into the Next Century" in
MicrQenlerprise Results Reporting for J998 (September), p. 1.
7 Berenbach, Shari and Diego Guzman. ~ 994. "The Sdlidarity Group Experience Worldwide" in Maria Otero and
Elisabeth Rhyne, Eds. The New World of Microenterprise: Building Healthy Finmciallnstitutions for the Poor.
Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc, p. 156-184.
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requisite of group formation is that no two members can be from the same family. Another requisite
for group formation is that its members must have similar business productivity levels.

Village Banking. This lending model uses the solidarity group as a base but on a larger level
and is a community-managed credit and savings program.8 The goal of village banking is not only to
provide access to credit but also to serve as an avenue in which clients can learn the value of savings.
Each village bank is usually comprised of30-50 individuals, who fonn solidarity groups. On a much
smaller scale than commercial microcredit banks, village banks are non-profit, yet profitable,
organizations. They maintain a focus on enhancing the social status of women by providing them the
financial leverage they need to supersede male-dominated spheres. Payments are made in cycles.
Upon the completion of a cycle, the credit has been repaid and compulsory savings can reach up to
20 percent of the initial loan amount. If a client wishes to abandon the program, their entire savings
are not readily available, and full collection could take up to 3 months. Village banking is financially
sustainable because it uses captured savings by employing interest rates of 15 percent annually and
uses this revenue to issue more loans with interest rates at 30 percent annually.

Individual Lending. Individual loans are more popular in institutions that seek to attract
clients with well-established and productive businesses. Individual loans target a narrower range of
businesses because these businesses can produce assets for collateral that newer and smaller
businesses cannot. The individual lending model appeals to individuals who dislike the solidarity
model and having to take responsibility for others. Individual lending gives a client more freedom
and is clearly a self-accountable method to assure repayment. Similar to the formal banking sector,
clients are asked to demonstrate their abi,lity to pay by offering coHatera~ 'sufficient to insure the loan.
Collateral usually impl1ies hens on movable assets such as appliances of significant value (ie.

8 Holt, Sharon.....The Village Bank Methodology: Performance and Prospects" in Maria Otero and Elisabeth Rhyne. Eds.
Th.e New World of Mioroenlerprise: Building Healthy Financiallnsri!Utions for the Poor. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian
Press, In!;:. p.1157.
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machinery, jewelry, or furnishings) or pr.openy. In cases where the client's assets are not sufficient
collatera~,a personal

guarantor is also required.

Methodol'ogy
My interest in this topic stems from my fascination with the Bolivian infonnal market In
AiUgu.st 200 I, I was affo.rded 'the opportunity -to study in l.a Paz, Bolivia. My stay made me think
about the informal sector and especially the market vendors. I was astounded that I could leave my
house and buy a bag of milk on ,tbe street comer.

~

was' surprised when my host mom said! that we

we're going grocery shopping and we ended up carrying nylon sacks from one market vendor to
another to buy food for the week.

~t

took me weeks to understand bow this informal worked, but

after I became more confident, I trav,eled to the market and took care of personal business. When

~

needed a strap on my sandal fixed, I took it w the shoemaker at the end of the block. When I needed
to buy groc,eries, I bartered with the caseras to get the best price for meat, potatoes, and vegetables.

It was through this direct participation with market vendors that I became interested in their work
Arriving back in the United States, I remembered a particular protest that took place in front
of BancoSQl. These poor people were market vendors among other m icroentrepreneurs and they
were angry a'bout somethlllg, but I could not remember wbat. Recalling this event piqu.ed my mterest
about BancoSol and microcfedit, and I decided this was something I wanted to know more about
Therefore from my mterest in market vendors and my recollection of BancoSol, I proposed to write a
thesis about the Bolivian microcredi,t experience. Returning to Bo:hvia for one month of fieldwork in
January 2003, I collected information about/from four microcredit institutions.

[performed

interviews with bank officers and market vendors, seeking to find information on tbe social and
economic ,eomponents of microcredit I also visited the Bolivian office of the United States Agency
for International Development (USAIDlBoHvia) where I asked for access to any reports or studies
written about the impact stud,ies of microcredit. [undertook observation of market vending at its
most basic level, street vending.

I spoke with vendors in hopes to ben.er understand the dajly
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challenges they confront, and how microcredit has affected their lives, both socially and
economically.

In the following pages, I recount the adventures and mishaps of my fieldwork. I believe that
my studies were expansive enough to present various points of view concerning microcredit. My
contacts i neluded a wide selection 0 fp eople with different v iews and concerns a bout m icrocredit
operations. My multi-faceted approach included contacts who: (1) came from different social and
economic

backgrounds~

(2) were involved in microcredit on different levels (either as professionals

or participants) and; (3) were non-participants but suspect and/or feel the economic effects of
microcredi 1.

Collection of Comparative Data
In my approach, I chose to evaluate the performance of microcredit through systematic
assessment. That is, at each financial institution, I asked the same questions.

First, I sought to

understand the microcredit from a client's point of view. I visited each institution and asked how I
could receive a loan for my commercial business. I was received with some suspicion because I was
a foreigner, but each afforded me the opportunity to observe and participate as would any client
wanting to take out a loan. The loan officer asked me a series of questions. What was my line of
business?

How long had I been in the business? How much money did I want to take out? What

could I offer as collateral? What were my expenses? How much could I afford to pay back on a
monthly basis? After colilecting this information, the loan officer told me how microcredit lending
worked. She addres-sed the requirements to take out the loan., including the collateral requirement
(which differed according to the loan model that was used), repayment plan, and interest rate. After
the institution received all the necessary documents, I would have my loan within five to seven days.

In all cases, the default interest rate was not offered unless I specifically asked for it.
Throughout the process there were some variations. In the cases of PRODEM and FIE, client
expenditures and loan amounts were critically analyzed and compared to lessen the likelihood of loan
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default. BancoSol and Caja Los Andes were not so particular in client evaluation. In all cases (with
the exception of BancoSol), tlle loan process included a visit to the business location or the home
where the client must show proof of hislher business. This varied from a loan officer going to the
home to look at a pile of books to be sold on the street or visiting the textile enterprise that employed
eight family members who would then redistribute products to several smaller enterprises.

I also visited the office of the Association of Specialized Microcredit Financial Entities
(Asotin), where I collected comparative data on the financial perfonnance of the larger microfinance
institutions. Asofin serves a s a financial intennediary between the Bolivian Government and the
microfinance institution. The office had current information and told me that data from earlier years
was available in the Microfinance BuHetin, which could be purchased at Finrural for five dollars.

MICROFINANCE LENDING CONDmONS
Table 1.1

Microfinsnce
Institution
Banco Solidario, S.A.

Lending
Model
Solidarity

Individual

Individual

Caja Los Andes, Ffl>

j
PROOEM, FFP
I

Requisites
Client

Guarantor
1

wPhotocopy ofl.D.
-Proof of business
-Photocopy of 1.0.
-Proof of business
-Collatera] (if any)

-Photocopy of1.D.
-Sketch of location
of home and
business

Photocopy ofl.D.
~Proof of business

-Photocopy ofLD.
-Job type (job certification, last
pay s!rub)
wColIateral (home, vehicle,
property, anticrerico contract)
I -Photocopy of 1.0.
-CoIlatera II (home, property)
-Last tax payment
-Photocopy ofHght and water
invoice
~Sketeb of location of home
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FIE, FFP

Individual

-Photocopy of I.D.
-Photocopy of light
and water invoice
-Credit appl1cation
-Collateral
(machinery or other
appliances)

-Photocopy on.D.
-Photocopy of light and water
invoice
-Collateral (home, property, other
machinery or appliances)

I also spoke with loan officers and managers as an investigator. I asked them many of the

same questions I asked in my role played as a client. How does microcredit work? What were some
of the greatest challenges of the institution? What was the institution's main objective? Each one
had similar information to offer. The microcredit model was explained exactly as I perceived it as a
potential client. I was shown how the institutions processed the loans, verified credit history with
credit bureaus, visited work sites, and took pictures of appliances to be uses as collateral. In the case
of PRODEM, I was able to see the entire application of one of their older clients and the complexity
of deciding the loan amount to be issued. At this step in the process I also collected important
comparative data about loan portfolios, for example, the percentage of female versus male clients, the
number of solidarity versus individual loans (at BancoSol), the percentage of clients that defaulted on
loan payment, etc. I also received a copy of the 2001 Annual Reports for each institution.
Interviews
I was able to perform interviews with participants and non-participants in microcredit. I

interviewed a market vendor, Blanca de Chuquinia, who sold Bolivian and Peruvian artesania. She
was a client of both BancoSol and Caja Los Andes. At BancoSol she had taken out a solidarity loan
with four other women, and at Caja Los Andes she served as a guarantor for a friend. However, not
only did I a sk a bout t he effects 0 f m icrofinance. but I a Iso sought to know what 0 ther dynamics
affected her work as a market vendor.

For Blanca, the most pertinent factor that affected her

business was the competition with ambulantes and the lack of government control over their work.
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Blanca expressed that she resented having to pay taxes-40 bolivianos every two months to the State
and 150 bolivianos a year to the mayor-while the amubulantes paid nothing.
I also interviewed with the Garron family and friends. Indeed my contact with these people
was a miracle. Raul Garron., is the father of a friend of mine. Raul is a self-employed financial
consultant and was able to put me in contact with his friend, Xavier lturralde. Fortunate for me,
Xavier was an expert on the economic history of Bolivia. He and I spent hours going over the
history.

He put me in contact with managers of each institution of interest, introducing me and

asking them to assist me in anyway possible. He was very kind and encouraged me in my work,
saying that a microcredit study was a very important topic for Bolivia today. He also presented his
own analysis of where he sees· microcredit heading, asserting that microcredit needs to be reevaluated
because it truly no longer is microcredit but rather normal credit. In fact he says that the larger the
loans get in these institutions the greater the economic danger because regular banks will cease

to

exist. I revisit this argument later on.
Members of the Garron family believe that microcredit is headed in the wrong direction.
They believe that the poor will just get poorer because eventually they will be unable to pay back
their loan and over-indebtedness undoubtedly

win

follow, leaving the economy in shambles. The

crisis of 1999 may attest to this fact. The Garr6ns believe this is another political game played by the
elite in orderto ex>pl'oit the pOQr; but proof is hard to come by in support of this statement.
I also visi,ted USAIDfBolivia, one of the most

ptominen~

providers of microfinance aid.

Even though USAID did not provide capita'll to any of the founding NGOs of my srudy, it has funded
research for some studies about microcr~dit clients in Bolivia. Claudio Gonzalez-Vega of Ohio State
University did one such study of ProMnjer, a mictolending organization in Ei Alto. This study and
others like it anempt to recognize and identify flaws in the microc'redit mode1.

From USAID, I

hoped to get information abou,t their first invesliInents in microcredit in Bolivia. Gabriela Salazar
Rivera, Activity Manager, said that this information had been destroyed because initial investment
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was in 1988-too long ago to keep around the office. Nevertheless, Gabriela did redirect me to some
other institutions that would assist me in my search for impact studies, particularly Gesellschafi fur

Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ or the German Technical Corporation) and the Association of
Financial Institutions for Rural Development (Finrural).

These institutions serve as technical

assistants for microfinance institutions, providing several types of analyses pf microfinance
operations.
I also visited PRODEM NGO. In this office, I spoke with Maria Elena Querejazu, who gave
me a short overview of the history of PRODEM NGO transfonnation. I was told that the functions
of PRODEM NGO are solely based in rural areas. Maria Elena was quite occupied and was unable
to help me funher.

Literature Review
1 visited the libraries of the Foundation for Production (FundaPro) and Finrural. Similar to
Finrural, FundaPro was established by international agencies and the Bolivian government; it serves
as a technical assistant for micro finance institutions. Unfortunately, the FundaPro library was "under
construction" and I was not able to peruse their collection. The Finrural office was very helpful, and
there I found extensive literature and other references concerning microcredit in rural and urban
Bolivia. The staff was very cordial, and I was able to copy various articles from booles that were
pertinent to my research.

Observation
I also observed the petty commerce market sector as a participant and a researcher. Walking
down the streets of La Paz, I intensively observed each and every transaction in an attempt to
understand the challenges market vendors confront. I spoke with those who interacted with market
vendors, such as wholesalers, security guards, consumers, and other market vendors.

These

conversations helped me understand the market vendor experience. To the untrained eye, market
vending might seem like a simple transaction between buyer and producer.

But for the market
16

vendor, it is a livelihood that embodies many additional relationships. Beyond producer-consumer
relationships, market vendors deal with issues of security, cooperation., competition, and bargaining,
which requires the vendor to establish a broad network of relationships.

Market vending also

demonstrates distinct cultural, political, and economic factors. As I got a better understanding of all
of these aspects, I was able to ask pertinent questions according to the specificity of my research.

Limitations, Importance, and Merits ofStudy
While I was able to guide my study by some fieldwork done by Stephanie Small (1998), my
own study obviously holds some limitations. My study may be an effective tool to begin evaluating
the economic impact of microcredit at the macro level, yet there are many other dynamics that must
be considered. It is also unfortunate that I was unable to speak with someone whose business clearly
benefited from microcredit. The Annual Reports of all the institutions boast of their success stories,
but I surmise that these stories are few and far betw.een. However, again, the information that I was
able to collect is an indicator that perhaps all is not well in microcredit. I wish for this thesis to be
used as a point of reference for funher studies on microcredit. And ifrny conclusions hold true, than
any upcoming crisis in microcredit can be addressed within the contex.t of the information provided.

17

CHAPTER TWO:
DEFJNING DEVELOPMENT: 1970 TO PRESENT DAY
The meaning of development in Bolivia has undergone significant change in the past three
decades. Popular organizations, political leaders, and foreign actors have prompted these changes,
each seeking top lay a role ins haping and defining development for t he country. T he following
chapter includes a historical description of the political and economic reorganizations in Bolivia from
1970 to present day.

This chapter highlights the important policy decisions that resulted in the

substantial growth of the unemployed class (referred to in Chapter three as the informal sector) and
illustrates the weakness of development theory to effectively address multifaceted societal problems.
This chapter describes the mining and agricultural sectors at length, focusing on which actors
benefited

OF

not from certain economic policies, and how politics play a role in shaping class

structure. I pay particu'larly close attention to the cost-benefit analysis of economic policy, because
as I discuss later on, subsequent political and economic change in Bolivia "tum the tables" and the
"winners·" of state developmentalism become the losers of neoliberalism.
The Rise and Decline of State Developmentalism (1970·1984)
From 1971 to 1978, General Hugo Banzer, dictator, led a very repressive regime. Backed by
civil technocrats, Banzer believed that an authoritarian regime could best define and interpret
national interests, which left no room

fOT

political parties.

Using a top-down model, state

developmentalism benefited certain groups of the economic elite and excluded others.

State

developmentalism entailed large investments in targeted state-led sectors, including agricultural,
mining, and petroleum.

Protectionist policies were implemented in order to shelter domestic

industries from foreign goods competition. B anzer a Iso tried to dismantle labor unions, although
unsuccessfully, which had grown to enjoy their popular power during the previous dictatorships of
Ovando and Torres, leftist leaders.
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Under state developmentalism, Banzer granted subsidies to the private, agricultural sector.

Banco Agricola deB olivia (BAB), the state agriculture bank., channeled cre<Ht to the Santa Cruz
region, which received 66 percent of all BAB credit. 9 Cotton production received most of this aid
but other productions such as sugar, soybean, and cattle ranching were also included. !Interestingly, a
101

of this credit came from international development agencies, mostly from the United States.

USAID controUed 46 peroent of the total foreign.financed credit. The World Bank and the InteF
American Development Bank (IDB)IO provided the remaining 54 percent.. loaning directly to the
government. II

For the agricultural elite, business boomed and policies worked in their favor.

Protectionist policies safeguarded the marketability of production on international

mar~ets

even, but

only for mass prodlicers. Srnall farmers were not gi,ven access to this credit The settlers of these
small farms had landl on the frontier, but it was no competition for commercial farming, which
received large state grants for land and sllbstdies. SmaU farmers became tenant fanners and wage
laborers, because-they could no longer compete.
The mining industry was also targeted by state-led development. After the oari:onalization of
Bolivian mines during the 1952 Revolution, the foreign exchange between the Bolivian State and
international markets began to increase.

Under state developmental policies, the state mining

company, Corporaci6n Minera de Bolivia (COMIBOL), provided miners with an entire social
welfare plan, including health, education,. and food benefits. Isolated from major urban centers, the
mining sector independently stood out as the major source of employment for Bolivians in these
areas. The strength of the mining sector and the formation of unions helped solidify the voice of
miners concerning the political and economic issues that would affect them. Unions were able to
9 Conaghan, Catherine M. and James M. ~Ioy. 1994. Unsettling Statecraft; Democracy and Neoliberalism in the
Central Andes. Pi1ttsburgh; University of Pittsburgh Press, Inc. p. 57.
10 The Inter-American Development Bank is thoe oldest and largest regional multilateral d'evelopment institution. It was
estabhshed in December of 1959 to !help accelerate economic and social development in latin America and the Caribbean.
Its curren I member countries include the U.S., Canada, several Latin American and Caribbean nations, among other non
regional actors. For more infonnation see www.iadb.org.
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protect employment benefits even as the State sought to repress political opposition. Any attempt
made by Banzer to implement unfavorable policies that would benefit the elite, such as wage freezes,
was impeded by unionized labor.

Moreover, unionized power miners also knew that the Banzer

regime depended on their cooperation to implement export strategies, and therefore they used their
political leverage to secure worker benefits.
The profits from the export boom in mining did not translate into proportionate benefits along
class lines. Wbile the miners did enjoy some benefits, government technocrats benefited much more.
Banzer's strong commitment to maintaining his coalition of technocrats led him to create 24 new
government bodies between 1971 and 1977.

In comparison, the mining sector saw few new

employment opportunities. While the public sector grew in at an annual rate of 9.9 percent from
1971·1975, this represented a growth three times as high as the employment growth rate in the labor
force as a whole. 12
Investment

m

the

expanding

petroleum

industry-the

Bolivian

State

Petroleum

Enteq>rise lJ -recei,ved a lot of attention from industrialized nations that were dependent on
petroleum

SOUFces

from other countries. Petroleum was first exported in 1966, averaging 11 percent

of all Bolivian exports. From 1970-1976, exports reached their peak at 16 percent of all exports.
These numbers impressed the international community.

14

Perhaps making investment even more

convincing, in March 1972, the General Hydrocarbons Law gave foreign investors a generous laX
break on 50 percent of all production for thirty years and a 40-60 percent share of production on new
petroleum source discoveries. IS

The petroleum industry boom, however, did not last.

In 1976

production for exports stopped, ,largely due to limited exploration for new reserves.

II Gill, Lesley. 1987. !Peasants, Entrepreneurs. and Social Change: Frontier Developmendn, Lowland Bolivia. Boulder,
CO: WeS1View Press, 52.
12 Conaghan & Malloy, p. 52.
,)J ,[n Spanish, facimielltos Petroliferas Fiscales Bolivianos (YPfB).
10 Morales, waltraud Q. 1992. Bolivia: Land of Struggle. Boulder, CO: Westview Press. p. 149.
Ij

Ibid, 150.
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State developmentalism not only promoted high levels of production but also it led to the
growth ofa booming, state·led financial sector. lbroughout all of Bolivia the business elite financed
their endeavors through newly established banks, including: La Paz Bank, Potosi Bank, Oruro Bank.,
Cochabamba Bank, and Santa Cruz Bank. The Central Bank of Bolivia borrowed money from
international markets and loaned money to these banks at low interest rates in order to sustain state
enterprises. Banks were functional and quite successful for the elite, but they did not offer any
services to the working class.
From 1971 to 1976, prices for Bolivia's main exports----agricultural and mineral-rose,
resulting in a 5.7 percent increase in the annual gross domestic product (GDP) rate. 16 This "economic
miracle," however, cannot be attributed solely to state development strategies, because external
factors played a huge role. The world market prices for raw materials laid the foundation for such a
miracle. Banzer took advantage of these favorable factors and pursued policies that would strengthen
the agricultural and mining sectors in order generate overall economic growth.
Among the sectors that did not benefit from state developmentalism were individual
businessmen who were not associated with state-led initiatives, and who preferred a free trade
economic model. While some domestic businessmen opted to collaborate with Banzer in hope of
receiving some benefits and not being excluded from decision-making processes, others participated
in an exit strategy, reallocating funds in other endeavors. They refused to invest money in the
government, hoping to pressure it to abandon protectionist policies that did not benefit them.
Intemationa,l inyestors participated in a partial exit strategy. Instead of pulling out all investment that
was related to, government enterp.rises, they channeled money through non-governmental
organizations (NGOs) that advocated the suspension of state protectionism. The Catholic Church
sponsored some of these organizations.

Others were linked to the Movimiento de lzquierda

16 Conaghan, Catherine M. and James M. Malloy. 1994. Unsettling Statecraft: Democracy and Neoliberalism in the
Central Andes. Pittsburgh: University of Pinsburgh Press, Inc. p. 57.
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Revolucionaria (MIR), an opposition party that hoped for the fall of the Banzer regime.

These

NGOs formed coalitions with foreign investors and their respective governments in order to bring
about change in Bolivia. NGOs were funded by international organizations that refused to channel
money through authoritarian governments that were obviously undemocratic. Taking a closer look at
the interests of international actors, however, the more likely reason for channeling money through
NGOs rather than the government was the concern for protecting their assets from government
intervention. The nationalization ofprivate firms in 1952 still weighed heavily on the minds of many
capitalists.
The decline of state developmental policies was the result of both national and international
pressures. On the national level, Bolivian conservatives and the working class challenged the Banzer
regime and demanded democratic elections. Bolivian conservatives wanted a government that would
implement market policies that benefiting them.
politics of the Banzer regime.

The working class had tired of the repressive

Countries with big banks and interested investors, such as the U.S.

and Switzerland, also supported the reemergence of "democracy." These countries knew that a
concession to democracy would invariably lead to an advantageous economic model-neoliberalism.
Yielding to these pressures, Banzer knew that the transition to democracy was inevitable, and in
December 1978 he announced that elections would be held. Democracy, however, was not so easily
achieved. Party leaders and military generals competed for power, and from 1978 to 1981 there were
a series of fraudulent elections and military coup d 'etats.
On the international level, state developmentalism could not hold out against the pressures of

foreign governments. Beginning in early 1980 the international economy entered a state of crisis.
The tin market collapsed, devastating the Bolivian mining sector. United States President Reagan
began tot ake a dvantage oft he low interest rates a nd financed. the U.S. f ed.eral deficit with these
monies. The international prime rate went from 8 percent to 21 percent., and high levels of inflation
plagued Bolivia. The Central Bank of Bolivia could not acquire loans from international markets at
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such high rates, and therefore was unable to continue assisting the Bolivian industries with state
subsidies. Severe drought in 1983 and failing markets caused agricultural output to decline by 11
percent and exports to fall 25 percent between 1980 and 1984. 17 The Bolivian economy needed the
assistance of the international community, and the only way to get this help was a return to
"democracy" and free market trade.
In 1982 Bolivia returned to democratic rule after more than a decade of nearly uninterrupted
military authoritarianism. Hem.an Siles Zuazo, of the Union Democratica Popular CUDP), was elected
President. His election to office could not have come at a more inopportune time. He had inherited a
$5 billion foreign debt from the Banzer regime. Zuazo tried to promote a "populist democracy." He
tried to gain the support of the Bolivian Labor Central (Central Obrera Boliviana, COB)-Bolivia's

largest trade union confederation-but the trade-off demanded by the workers was too high. The
COB demanded shared management of the public sector. Political parties broke into several factions
and it appeared that a military coup was imminent-this time by Zuazo's Vice President, Jaime Paz
zamora. Overwhelmed by the economic problems and intense political dissension, Zuazo called for
elections one year before his four-year term was due to end.
Neolibetalism 0985-

)

In July 1985 new elections took place and Victor Paz Estenssoro of the National
Revolutionary Movement (MNR) party won the presidential seat. Faced with the pressures of a huge
foreign debt, Paz conceded to the international pressures. The International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank's demanded the removal of protectionist policies and the liberalization of trade. It is
interesting to note that these same organizations had contributed aid in order to protect certain
markets, and now that Bolivia suffered from huge foreign debt, it was time to open up the market.
paz introduced the Bolivian economy to neoliberalism. Neoliberal measures included selling state
enterprises to the private foreign investors such as U.S. corporations at very cheap prices, raising

17

Klein, Herbert S. 2003. A Concise History of Bolivia. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.240.
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producer prices for agricultural products, devaluing the national currency, reducing the government
deficit, and creating incentives to attract foreign capital. l8 The neoliberal model was to bring about
improvements in productivity and competition.

Yet its policies benefited social and economic

classes unevenly, and consequently had profound effects on the class structtrre.

Bolivians still

remember and bitterly refer to the neoliberal shock as veintiuno zero sesenta after the Supreme
Decree 21060. Scholarly literature refers to paz's neoliberal refonns as the New Economic Policy.
Raising the prices for agricultural goods was meant to be an incentive to increase production.
It did indeed increase the "incentive" for production., but more appropriately defined, it created the
need to produce more. The swift devaluation of agricultural goods in unprotected markets made it
much harder to profit. Exposing national produce to competition in larger markets that could sell
goods a lot cheaper than Bolivian produce meant that agriculturists bad to produce more goods for
less money. The reduction of the government deficit led to major cuts in BAR subsidies. After years
ofprofiting from protectionist policies, the agriculture elite had to look for new profitable investment
opportunities. It is difficult to pinpoint what new areas received investment, because in Bolivia
investors are protected the status of socios anonimos, or anonymous partners. It can be speculated,
however, that investment was eventually channeled to the microfinance sector.
Those who suffered most were small farmers, whose sole livelihood was based in agriculture.
The devaluation of agricultural production Ilileant that their work was worth little. With no benefits
under state protectionist

po~icies,

an entire sector of Bolivian society became impoverished. Many

fanners moved from their rurall dwellings to the city in search of better economic opportunities.
Others c hose to remain 0 n t heiir land and w,ork, a lthougb their produce did not provide sufficient
earnings for their households.

1& Veltmeyer, Henry, James Petras, and Steve Vieux. 1997. Neoliberalism and Class Conflict in Larin America: A
Comparative Perspective on the Political Economy of Srruetura! Adjustment. New York: S'- Martin's Press, Inc. p. 21-22.
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Drastic changes took place in the newly privatized mining sector as well.

The collapse of

the Banzer regime meant the collapse of state-led industry. Although the New Economic Policy was
supposed to free up funds that were "ill-spent" on subsidies, the decline in mine productivity meant
that the State no longer had funds to support such exports anyway. Those who suffered the most
adverse consequences from the collapse of stale industries were the miners. They first began to feel
the loss 0 f government social welfare benefits. S chaol supplies grew 5 carce a nd medicines were
unavailable in hospitals.

Food subsidies for rice, meat, sugar, and bread were also no longer

availabl\e. Isolated in remote areas and without access to markets that carried the necessary resources
to care for their sic.k., educate their children, or feed their famiilies, miners went on strike--their usual
recourse when met with dissatisfying econoIIric policies. Yet in 1985 these strikes were no longer an
effective political tool It a deter unfavorable policies. Tin was no longer the strategic product for
nationali development The loss of these benefits forc.ed miners out of their jobs. With no way to
provide for their fantilies and little hope of getting governmental concessions, many miners packed
up and! headed to the city. Whose who chose to "stick it out" in hopes of improvement saw even
grimmer days: drastic wage decreases and wage freezes.. In August 1985 miners earned US$60 per
month; only one year later wages fell to USS43 per montb. 19

Tin Production iin BoJj.yja, 1970-1999

Table 2.1
Decade
1970-1979
]980-1989
1990-1'999

l

1

Avera.ge Annual
Production
29,731
19,031
15,423 I

1

I Source: KJein, Herbert S. 2003. A Concise
Mistory of Bolivia. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press. p. 272.
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Gill, Lesley. I997(b). "Relocating Class: Ex-Miners and Neoliberalism in Bolivia" in CriIique ofAnthropology (17)3:

298.
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The Union Confederation of Miners in Bolivia2o--the nation's largest miner's union-staged
a 24-hour strike together with the Central Obrera Boliviana (COB). The strike gained it the attention
of government officials who felt compelled to negotiate with tbe miners. At the negotiating table the
government agreed to provide job retention guarantees for half the miners and compensation for
those who had to be let go. Some miners obstinately opposed the deal, arguing that the union should
not consider downsizing a viable option. Others favored compensation because they believed it was
best they could hope for. The negotiation with the government was never collectively resolved, and
individual miners made their own decisions about where to stand on the issue. Some took their
money (about $1,500), packed up, and left. Others choose to "stick it out" in hopes of renegotiations.
This event holds a great deal of significance for Bolivian unions, because it points to the initial
cleavage that led to subsequent division of a strong labor union. For the COB, the lack of consensus
meant the loss of political leverage with the government. For the Bolivian government, this meant it
had finally met its goal---established long before paz's inauguration-of effectively undennining
working class power.
Workers that opted to stay were also eventually forced out of their jobs.

Machinery

maintenance dwindled due to the lack of spare parts. Workers took early retirement and others were
"encouraged" to take voluntary retirement. Compensation for these late goers steadily increased as
the government sought to persuade miners from their jobs. In 1986 compensation had reached
$3,000. By the early 1990s, the government was offering an extra $1000 for every year of workY
The message from t he government was loud and c lear-"Just leave!" From 1986 to t 992 a bout
30,000 miners and their families were forced into unemployment
Foreign investors and Bolivian nationals formerly excluded from state initiative benefits had
long awaited the benefits that the neoliberal economic model would bring them.

20

For private

In Spanish, Federacioll Sindical de Trahajadores Mineros en Bolivia (FSTMB).
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investors such as Rockefeller, Swiss Development Bank, and USAID, the neoliberal model was the
most "efficient" way to produce economic growth and development. Of course for these wealthy
businessmen, free trade meant enonnous profits. They had capital to invest in expanding markets.
As mentioned earlier, the expanding markets in Bolivia were not the agriculture and mining sector.
These markets had collapsed under the intense competition and prices too low to translate into
Bolivian prosperity. The expanding and most profitable market was in the financial sector. The
liberalization of interest rates drastically devalued Bolivian currency. Consequently investment in
the financial sector, where money had amazing exchange rates with the boliviano (Bolivian
currency), was especially beneficial. U.S. dollars would go a lot further than the boliviano, and
interest rates could be adjusted to make for this difference. lbat is, loans issued in bolivianos would
accrue at interest rates higher than the dollar in order to adjust for the constant devaluation of
Bolivian currency. For financial marketers, Bolivia was a "land of opportunity."
Most private investors looked to do business with the rapidly multiplying number of NGOs
that promoted neoliberal politics. Whereas only one hWldred NGOs were initiated between 1960 and

1980, over four hundred emerged from 1980 to 1992. 22 This tremendous growth can be attributed to
the increased demands by international institutions such as the World Bank and USAID to channel
money through NGOs rather than directly to the central government. NGO work targeted poverty
and "grassroots development." Grassroots development advocates the improvement of basic living
conditions 0 fthe poorest sectors 0 fs ociety, i neluding programs 0 riented towards nutrition, health
care, education, housing, and employment.

Later 014 grassroots development was renamed

grassroots empowerment. Grassroots empowerment considered the poor as the primary promoter of
their own well being, that is the poor should not simply be recipients of assistance but active

21 Gill, Lesley. I997(b). "Relocating Class: Ex~MineTS and Neolibera1ism in Bolivia" in Crilique ofAnthrofXJlogy (17)3:
299.
ZlGill, Lesley. I997(a). "Powet" Lines: The Political Context of Nongovemmental Organization (NGO) ACliviry in El
Allo, Bolivia" in Journal oflAtin American Aruhropology 2(2): 147.
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participants

in

helping to improve daily lives.

Stephanie Small writes that these changes help

agencies like USAlD to convince their governments that microcredit is not an ineffective "hand
outs" program. She writes, "Both congress and the public prefer development without a price tag so
they can help the poor but not spend billions of dollars ...Such a strategy also ,appeals to the ideas that

"they" (Bolivians) should not be dependent on u.s" (Americans) but should take care of themselves
and stand on their own two feet."23 Redefining development from a bottom~up rather than a topdown approach, N GOs believed that m iCFocredit met these c'riteria. N GOs claimed that the poor
would now also reap the benefits of a free market economy.
Implications of Changing Development Strategies
Changes from state developmentalism to neoliberalism, and specifically microcredit, point to
significant reorganizations of class in Bolivia. The statist development strategy created a working
class in Bolivia and the neoliberal model destroyed it.

After 1985, class lines were completely

redrawn. The largest and most impoverished classes included the rural and urban poor. The middle
class was nearly non-existent. The upper class included the rich, capitalist class, which controlled
the majority of productive resources. As explained by Lesley Gill, neoliberal policies «relocated
class.,,24
Promised were made by the government to provide alternative employment options, but these
options never materialized. As a result, most miners scattered allover the country. Some went to the
urban centers in search of employment, while others sought to buy land near Bolivia's border. Some
miners organized themselves into cooperatives to work in the few dysfunctional state mines that were
not privatized. Others went back to their rural cormnunities of origins that needless to say, held very

2J Small, Slephanie. 1998. Missing from the Miracle: MiCTOCTedit and Urban Market Women in Bolivia. Senior Honors
Thesis, Colby College, p. 43.
24 Gill, Lesley. I997(b). "Relocating Class: Ex-Miners and Neoliberalis-m io Bolivia" in Critique ofAf1thropowgy (17)3.
London: Sage Publications Ltd.
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few opportunities. Others left Bolivia altogether and headed for neighboring countries such as Chile,

'I and Argentma.
. 25
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Table 2.3
Structure of tbe Male EcoDomic:aJly
Active Populllltion by Sector, 1970-1986
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Table 2.3 indicates the levels of the male
employment in the agricultura'l, industrial,
and
service
sectors.
Agricultural
production was at an all time high during
Men (52.2%)
state developmentalism.
were employed as tenant fanners and wage
laborers. In 1980, however, this number
had dropped to 45.5 percent. By the
1990s, only 39.3 percent of' all men were
fanners. ·Those who migrated to urban
centers took up employment in the service
and industrial sectors. From 1970 to 1990
the service sector employment by males
increased from 27.9 percent to 42.2 percent
as men tried to find their niche irn urban
centers. In 1970 both men (20%) and
women (21.9%) held jobs in the industrial
sector. However, unemployed men began
to migrate to the city looking for work. As
Table 2.4 indicates, industries began to
employ men over women. For this reason
there is not a sharp decline of male
employment in the industrial sector, as one
would suspect because of the downsizing
of the mining industry. Women who were
pushed out of industrial jobs became more
involved in the agriculture and service
sectors.

Source: Statistical Yearbook/or Latin America and the
Caribbean (ECL4.C) 2001.

Most scholars perceive the return of democracy in a positive light, because it caned for
democratically elected representation. People would finally have the opportunity to elect leaders that
represented their interests. Yet the lack of democratic rule is not what accounts for Bolivian poverty.
It is the neoliberal policies that destroyed working class interests. With each miner going his own

way, there were no collective interests to be represented.

The solidarity of miners during the

Bolivian dictatorship did not give miners a vote but it did provide them with crucial rights and
protections.

Today, miners no longer have solidarity but rather compete for access to scarce

30

resources. The coUective identity of unionism has been repI'aced with individualistio opportunism.
Democracy demanded representation. Neoliberahsm claimed economic growth and

deve~opment

However, nei:ther protected nor promoted the hlterests ofBo'livia's large working class.
From ,rime to time, the ex-mining sector shows public acts of solidarity in protest ofveinliun'o

zero sesenta. For example they may demonstrate in a centraUy ,located Plaza, crucifying their bodies
on flagpoles. In other moments, sympathizers join the miners, and together they march down the

Prado--La paz's busiest street--and halt transportation movement. But these miners represent only
a fraction of the entire ex-mining class.

The majority of the miners are seeking to readjust to

permanent unemplo)'filent, making do with what is available.

Many take temporary jobs as da,y

laborers iDe onstruction as t!be opportunity arises. 0 thers have e DroUed in the local university in
hopes that an education win increase Itheir chances in a highly competitive job market. Some ex
miners

a~e

plumbers,

~lectticians, or

mechanics who sit on rop ,oftheiir black toollbags in visible areas

of t he c ity~ w aiting for so meone to solicit their services. These kinds

0

fad hoc jobs a lie t emble

options for miners who are used to fixed wages, benefits, and economic security. Out there in the
streets wages come and go" there are no benefits, and economic security is a dream of the past.
The Bolivian family stFucture was tremendousl,y affected by steady unemployment.
Desperate miners turned to akobol in order to evade their personal failures as husbands and political
actors. In order to make ends meet, women were forced to leave the home and seek work in order to
supplement the sporadic incomes 0 H heir b usbands. T bese women currently line the streets with
their vending stands. Traditional housewilves are forced to perform double-duty,26 taking care of
their children and earning money by selling goods in an already saturated market. Women began to
resent their role as the primary breadwinner for the family. Men were willing to work, but no work
was available. Marriages began to fracture. The testimony of one ex-miner explained: ''Women out
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of desperation went with other men [who were not their companions] because the men had some sort
ofjob. It was everybody for themselves... If you die, yOUi die.,,27 Once again we can see that market
ideology not only affected macroeconomics but also penetrated to ev.en the basic units of society.

The neoliberal approach exacerbated inequalities by favoring elite groups that had access to
capital. and by excluding the poor from participating in the economy. Productive res-ources were
sold at discount prices to the highest bidder, allowing onJy the rich to reap the benefits. The benefits
of neoliberahsm reached the large landowners with export capabilities, while sman farming
enterprises were displaced. Mass production of low-priced consumer goods undennined small-scale

artisan production that has higher operational costs.

Notions of improved production and

competition only benefited the "big dogs" that could trade in international markets. Hence even
though the neoliberal model claims to produce economic growth and development, it fails to
acknowledge that development was for a select few.
The new of role of NGOs in mid and late 1980s demonstrates a significant change in the

definition of "development." First, neoliberalism demanded for the diminished control of the State in
promoting development. Foreign development agencies stepped into this vacuwn and established
NqoS, which introduced new, free-market "development" projects in Bolivia. NGO proposals of

"sustainable development" replaced many of the State's social welfare programs. Due to the fact that
the government relinquished most of its control to provide social services to the poor, the interests of
labor

unions

and

popular

organizations

were

largely

ignored.

for more information about market vendors' dual role in Bolivian society see Florence E. Babb's "Producers and
Reproducers: Andean Market Women i!\the Economy" in June Nash. Helen Safa, and contributors' Women and Change
in latin America. 1986. Soulh Hadley, Massachuseus; Bergin & Garvey ,Publishers, lnc.
n Gill,l..esley. I997(b). "Relocating Class: Ex-Miners and Neoliberalism in Bolivia" in Critique ofAnthropology (17)3.
London: Sage Publications LId. p. 301-302.
26

32

Second, the role of NGOs during the authoritarian government was clearly politically
motivated, whereas emerging NGOs claimed to be an apolitical status and benign force. NGOs,
however, are never strictly apolitical. Their appearance as an apolitical entity gives them a strategic
advantage by weaning the poor of the state and attracting them to nongovernmental projects. The
term "nongovernmental" social welfare programs suggest a true concern about the interests of the
poor rural and urban dwellers, while political parties appear unable and unwilling to repres'ent the
interests of their constiruents.

NGOs, however, are not apolitical regardless of their "non

governmental" status. Private investors with certain political and economic ideologies fund its entire
purpose of being. So while it can be argued that NGOs were less overt in their politicization during
the dictatorship, NGOs of the 21 st century are certainly driven by political influence and economic
gain.
In the financial sector, liberalization of credit and interests rates served as incentives for
foreign investors to increase investment. Struggling state banks were liquidated and closed. Seeking
an opportunity to make money in their absence, finance-oriented NGOs moved to the forefront.
Under the guise of providing social benefits to the poor vis-a-vis microcredit, NGOs embarked on a
mission to make money from poverty-stricken Bolivians. In the late 19805 and early 19905, new
financial institutions sprouted up. International organizations from the United States, Germany, and
Switzerland began to compete for a space in the microfinance sector. Their mission was to provide
banking services to t he poor that had been traditionally excluded from access to money markets.
NGO success in microenterprise development has prompted the State to abandon programs that
offered concrete benefits, such as health and education. 28 Microenterprise development theory fails
to address the origins of poverty, and legitimizes the State's poor effort to provide jobs, schools, and

U Gill, Lesley. Gill, Lesley. 1997(a). "Power Lines: The Political Contexl ofNongovemmental Organization (NGO)
Activity in El Alto, Bolivia" in Jounwl ofLatin American Anthropology 2(2): 155.
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health services to the poor by assuming access to capital will lead to improvement in all these areas.
Grassroots empowerment is all-inclusive in microcredit theory.

'Fable 2.5 (a)
Structure of the Economically Active Population by Economic
Seclor I 1970-1980-1990
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Source: SIQfistiCQI Ye(1rbookfor Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) 2001.

Table 2..4(a) sbows that die presence of agricultural subsidies led to displacement 01 sma I! f.armers by
commercial production. The service sector expanded sigruficantly due to the levels of migration into
the city. The industry or manufacturing sector stays about the same. Below in Tabl.e 2.4(b), ,the
exact percentages are listed. 29

Table 2.5 (b)
YEAR

Agriculture

Industry

Service

1970

52.1%

20.0%

27.9%

1980

45.5%

19.7%

33.8%

1990

39.3%

16.8%

42.2%

Source: Slatistical Yearbook for lAtin America and the
Caribbean. 2001. (ECLAC) 2001.

The statist development model provided access to productive resources that gave the poor
political leverage to secure social welfare benefits.

Neolibera1 policies have confiscated the

productive resources from the poor and are the central cause for increased poverty and

29

Percentage may not add up to 100 due to rounding.
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unemployment NGOs are not fixing the problem, but rather they are the "apo]itical" tools used to
advance it. The dominant players oftbe free market trade have once again found a way to exploi't t!he
market in the name of "social economic development."
Microcredit theory works so we)) within the neoliberal model that NGOs have failed to
provide altem.ative definiticns of development. Small

~usinesses" ,cannot

realistically reach a high

enough level ofpmduction to compele with larger markets. Microcredi,t provides

capita~

to the poor

but many of the poor have no access to productive resources. Development requires production, and
small market vendors are not producing products but rather wholesaling
goods.

mass~produced

consumer

Microfinance institutions, however, have produced a competitive financial market.

Neoliberalism Iilotesthat production and competition are key elements, and NGOs adhere 'lO 'these
criteria. Yet microcredit does not suggest the same criteria be used for the poor. Microcredit does
not create production nor does

i~

increase competition in any positive sense of the word.· For the

microentrepreneur, competition is not associated with large-scale trade in international market, but
rather it is associated with the daily pressure and struggles of surviving with limited resources.
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CHAPTER THREE:
UNDERSTANDING THE INFORMAL SECTOR
One can rightly assume that the informal sector is a characteristic of a Third World or
developing country. As noted in Chapter two, however, the arbitrary lines that define formal and
informal economies are really reflections of political decisions that

e~clude

certain groups from

participating in the economy. In such cases-as in the caSe of miners-unemployed persons seek a

living through other avenues, usually self-employment in commercial, manufacturing, or servIce
sectors.
~LUSTRATIVE

COMMER.CIAL
Street vendors
Snack food sellers
I Used clothing vendors
Convenience Stores
Market Vendors

TYPES OF MICROENTERPRISES
'ifabl'e 3.1
SERVICE
MANUFAC11JRlNG
Transportation
Tailor/seamstress
Barberslhairdressers
Cabinet/furniture mabng
Metal working
Machine repair
Bakery/food processing
Electronic repair
Beer productioD

Source: Adopted, from Berenbach, Sheri and Craig Churchill. 1()97. Re8,!!lation and
Supervision of MicrQfinance InstituriQns~ EJg!erience from Latin America. Asia and Africa.
Washington DC: The Miaofinance Network Occasional Paper No. t, ,p. 6.

Elisabeth Rhyne Dotes that there are three dominant perspectives regardring the role of the
irnformal economy.
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The first perspective is defined as residual. Macroeconomists tend to see the

growth ofllie informal sector as a {eSult of the fonnal sector's failure. Macroeconomists say that it is

the responsibility of ~he formal sector to provide empl'oyment, and if it is unable to do so, then one
sees the rise of the informal sector. They do not see the informal sector as a strong nor permanent
source of employment but rather as an economic safety net for bad economic times. The residual
model is not a reflection of what took place in Bolivia. The informal sector cannot be considered a
safety net for bad economic times. Bad economic times seem to be a permanent reality of the
Bollivian poor. The government made a conscious decision to destroy "formal" markets and displace
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workers to "informal" ones. The term "safety net" points to a temporary state; yet the neoliberal
policies of 1985, which are the cause of the creation of the informal economy, are not going to be
temporary.

Neoliberalism is here to stay, and the poor most definitely do not feel "safe" in

unemployment.
The second perspective states that the i nfonnal sector has a positive social and economic
influence.

The disenfranchised are taught to seek to improve their lives through self-help.

Mieroenterprise workers and oWDers realize that their work will "make or break" them, thus they
seek skills that ensure their economic

well~being.

After workers obtain entrepreneurial skills, they

invest their income where they see it as most benefic'ial to them; more likely than not they will invest
their money in their children, providing them with a better education. This perspective denotes lthat
microenterprise not only puts economic development in the hands of the workers but aiso and
perhaps more impo'rtantly, that social' development derives from economic independence.
There are two major problems with this perspective. First, it assumes that the. poor did not
seek

to

improve their lives ibefore. This, of course, is not the case. Workers an over Bolivia united

together to challenge the Banzer regime and were thus able to hold onto the workers benefits that
they did have. Second, mis perspective assumes that the poor did not know how to invest their
money well untill they became poor. If poor workers have not mvested in their children's education,
then it is becau_se they are trying to put food in theirr bellies.

To claim that the poor need

entrepreneurial skms essentiality in order to tteach them a lesson about e conomie independence is
complete nonsense. The poor are struggling to slilTVive with what they have. What they have are
small loans at higb interest rates. What they are expected to do is create a business that can make
that money multiply.

This is not economic independence, nor will it translate into social

development.

Rhyne, Elisabeth. 2001. Mainstreaming Microfinance: How Lending to the Poor Began, Grew, and Came of Age in
Bolivia. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc. p. 44-45.
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The third perspective focuses on the legal framework of the informal enterprise.
approach states that infonnal businesses do not seek to become formal businesses.

This

First and

foremost, the burdensome process of becoming recognized as a formal sector enterprise is just not
worth it. The time needed to complete the entire transaction may take up to a year. Besides this, the
legal recognition of formal status demands that the enterprise pay taxes and provide worker benefits.
Formality introduces a "whole new ball game" that is most likely more costly to and not in the best
interest of the owner.
Formal & Informal Economies
There are two major theories regarding the relationship between the fonnal and informal
economy. One theory states that the informal economy is constantly in competition with the fonnal
economy. Informal enterprises can evade traditional state regulations such as taxes, and are not
required to offer social welfare protection or adhere to strict labor laws regarding the rights of the
worker. Because of their "informal" nature, microenterprises compensate for their lack of fixed
capital by lowering their costs below those offered by formal enterprises. This point, however, is
often refuted due to the fact that there are microentrepreneurs that do pay taxes and do not seek to
evade such regulations.

In fact, those who label the informal sector as illegal over generalize,

because many vendors pay the applicable taxes with few qualms:
The other theory states that the informal economy is not in competition with the formal one
but rather that the informal and formal sectors are complements of one another.

Through

subcontracts, informal economies add value to products by lowering output costs such as hiring more
employees and providing them with employee benefits.
Bolivia's Urban Informal Economy

. One exception to this is the ambulantes or mobile market vendors, who intentionally move around in order to evade the
tax collectors that periodicall y patrol vending sectors of the city. This has been a constan~ source of 'tension between
market vendors because those wlth fixed kiosks, the eslableeidas, fed that all vendors shOUld receive equal treatment from
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When walking down the streets of La Paz, Bolivia, one finds that the infonnal sector
predominates, especially in the open market. Many of these peddling vendors are Ayrnara-speaking
women called cholas who sell an array of items, including perishables, auto replacement parts,
books, clothing, and just about any other item one could imagine. One cannot even describe the
economy of Bolivia without mentioning their presence.

Jaime Saenz, historian and expert on

Bolivian cultural anthropology, writes of the Rodriguez market, one ofta Paz's largest food markets,
it "is inseparable from the La paz chola, who is by her own right the owner...,,31 The art of street
vending can take on many different fonus, depending on the business. The smallest type of business
m.ay be a market vendor who wakes up at 5:30 a.m. to sell kleenex out of an open suitcase display
from any free space of the sidewalk. The more developed business may own or rent a permanent
kiosk with fancy display windows and a hired hand to help out.

Regardless of the

microentrepreneur's approach, competition is intense, with many products to sell and many people
selling them.
Besides the street-side vendors, there are other microentrepreneurs that produce in large
quantities and sell petty commodities as wholesale to entrepreneurs. Many of these microenterprises
are owned by a family and reside in the back or spare rooms of homes in poor sections of the city.
For these entrepreneurs, business is usually steady. Establishing a network of contacts and working
together, a family can to a certain extent secure consistent sales.

Wholesalers plan production

according to economic slowdowns and utilize the time to go out and seek new clients. Greater output
may necessitate more help, allowing the larger microenteq>rises to offer employment to non-family
members.

[he government. Eslablecidas say that if ambula.ntes do not have to pay taxes, neither should they. The competition that
exists between market vendors is revisited in chapter six.
31 Saenz, Jaime. 1979. Imagenes paeena.s: Lugares y personas de 18 c1udad. La Paz, Bolivia: Difusi6n. p. 57. My
translation,
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The rise of the informal sector in Bolivia can be attributed to two major developments. The
first of these was the incredible increase of migrants coming from rural areas and going to urban
centers beginning in the late 1960s. These migrants--mostly young people-traveled to the urban
centers searching for greater economic opportunities. They looked for apprenticeships and acquired
skills from others in a particular trade. Adjustments were made easier for those who already had

family members precede them whom could teach them the '1:ricks of the trade" and network them
into the economic system if not provide them a job. Some migrants made the urban centers their
permanent homes, while 0 thers came a nd went a s the seasons dictated sales. The growth of the
informal sector from the late 19605 onward is reflected in the following: In one of La paz's most
renowned food markets, Rodriguez, in 1967 the market's busiest days accounted 2,332 market
vendors. In 1992, this number had increased to 3)78 vendors, nearly a 62 percent increase. El Alto
markets showed similar growth for the same years. In 1967 approximately 15,000 vendors worked in
El Alto whereas by 1992 this number had risen to 27,371, an 82 percent increase. 32
The second cause of the growth of the informal sector is the 1985 economic policies and the
shrinking of state enterprises.

In 1985 the state developmental model was discarded and the

neoliberal model adopted. This meant that all state industries including, mining and manufacturing
were privatized.

The State no longer guaranteed secure employment with benefits, and the

downsizing of these industries meant mass unemployment. Workers accustomed to the job stability
were forced to seek alternative employment.

Finding themselves with few options, unemployed

workers practiced self-employment as a coping strategy. According to Rhyne, in 1985 the public

Buechler et aJ. 1998. "Financing Small-Scale Enterprises in Bolivia" in lynne Phillips, Ed. The Third Wave of
Modemiution in Latin America: CultUral Perspectives on Neoliberalism. Wilmington. DE: Scholarly Resources Inc. p.
86.
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sector employed 24 percent of the labor force in the three major cities of Bolivia: La Paz,
Cochabamba, and Santa Cruz. By 1989 this nwnber had fallen somewhat to 17 percent.)3
These large population shifts from rural to urban areas had to be dealt wiith tby 'the
government. Even though the policies to move towards neoliberalisrn were activ,ated by government
officials, the mass movement 0 f people to the cities was a great c oneem top oliticians. Bolivian
politicians knew that a great gathering ofpooe people' in one area had historically led to social unrest.

In order to avoid political instability and social unrest, the govenunent introduced the microcred.it
program. Since the State would no longer provide stable jobs, then it would provide credit. Credit,
however, is not employment. And even IthOUgh microcredit theory tries t.o link access to capital with
employment, there i.s no data supporting ithis statement. This will be addressed at greater length in
chapter six.
Other significant adjustments took place within the infonnal sector after the introduction of
neoliberalism in 1985. The number of manufacturing microenterprises fell while the number of
commercial ones increased. Rhyne claims that these changes were due to the influx of women into
the informal sector. Some of these women came from rural areas to the city as migrants, hoping to
earn extra money for families at home. Others were wives who sought to make up for the loss of
income 0 f t heir unemployed husbands. W bile t be initial motivation was out 0 f necessity and in
response to 1985 economic shocks, today informal market participation is motivated by other factors.
In 1985 male-operated manufacturing concerns no longer dominated this sector. Rather, femaIe
operated enterprises began to compete with the established manufacturers, forcing them to downsize.
Some sense for the rapidity with wbich women entered the infonnal sector may be gained by the
following; female participation in the labor force grew twice as fast as the total urban growth rate

Rhyne, Elisabeth. 2001. Mainstreaming Microfinance: HoY-' Lending ,to the Poor Began. Grew, and Came of Age in
Bolivia. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, mc. p. 42, 48.
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between 1985 and 1989.34 Unswprisingly, when microcredit officers went looking for potential
clients in February of 1987, they found success with female conunercial market vendors. 35
These changes in enterprise type and activity suggest a series of important social and
economic changes. On the one hand, these shifts in the infonnal sector demonstrate a positive social
effect, particularly for women. Women feel more empowered by having access to credit. They have
adopted the self-help attitude and impacted the informal economy to their favor. Women became
more independent, both economically and socially, of their male counterparts by gaining economic
control over their own assets. In general, women entrepreneurs tend to earn higher wages than men
do. Struggling mothers have expressed resenOTIent that men spend money unwisely, leaving children
poorly dressed and malnourished. One woman states, "No, I have never seen the man's money. not
even a cent. That luck I've had.,,36 This is ODe reason why poor women refuse the institution of
marriage; some go even as far as to liken marriage to colonialism.

These women do not need or

want husbands in their lives, because they are usually more of an economic burden than an economic
relief. A s a single woman with c antral

0

f her 0 wn assets, t be female entrepreneur can spend 0 n

things important to her, including the well being of her children.
On the other hand, the downsizing of microenterprises from manufactured goods to familialowned, commercial goods and services had a negative economic effect. The former signifies greater
sophistication and development than the latter. Perhaps manufacturing informal microenterprises
would have eventually developed into fonnal enterprises offering more job security and reaching a
broader group. Conversely, the commercial and service sectors grew, signifying a breakdown of the
manufacturing sector and what one (certainly I) would call a process of underdevelopment. Today
one sees this process has reversed itself once again, and family-owned microenterprises seek to
expand their businesses through greater production, which would require hiring more employees.

j4

Ibid, 49.

l~

£bid, 67.
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Today the micro entrepreneurial sector is quite important in the scope of Bolivian economic
prosperity. Totaling about 600,000 small and micro entrepreneurs, this sector represents 20-25
percent of Bolivian GDP. 37

~ Stephenson, Marcia. 1999. Gender and Modernity in Andean Bolivia. Austin: University of TelUlS Press. p. 29
}l International Finance Corporation.
http://wblnOO18.worldblmk.orgfIFCExtlspiwebsitel.nsf/f45 J ebbe34a9a8ca85256a55OO73ffl O/ad I f1 cOb03989roe85256c8
7007afbb2?OpenDocument {Accessed 2/28/2003 }
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CHAPTER FOUR:
NGO TRANSFORMATION & THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF MICROCREDIT
In this chapter, I discuss the origins of the Foundation for the Promotion and Development of
the Microenterprise Sector (PRODEM), Banco Solidario, S.A., Caja Los Andes, and the Center for
the Promotion of Economic Initiatives (FIE), four of Bolivia's most prominent microfinance
institutions.

Although microcredit is recognized as an important part of the Bolivian economic

model, this was not always the case. I will consider microcredit growth and development, through its
transformation from an NGO-based effort to, a full-fledged moneymaking business. In understanding
NGO transformation, I consider two main questions. First, what motivated NOG transformation?
Second, what actors were involved and what steps were taken to make transformation possible? My
cOlilcluding rema'rks discuss how NGO transfomlation affected the microcredit model by placing
emphasis Onl profitabi,hty.
Foundation for the Development of the Microentg2l'ise Sector (PRODEM), NGO
I begin my evaluation of microfinance institutions in Boiivia with PRODEM.
PRODEM was not the
impact

Oui

[ll'St

While

microfinance entity in Bolivia, it was the first to have a widespread

how mi'CTOcredit was perceived. Accion International, a U.S. non-profit organization,

assisted PRODEM in its initia] steps toward microcredit lending. 38 Accion sought to replicate the
microcredit model in Bolivia as it had previously done in other Latin American countries. Under the
leadership of Jack Duncan, founder and president of Accion, and Fernando Romero, a native
Bolivian and former owner of a local Coca-Cola Company, severnl prominent Bolivian businessmen,
including Roberto Capriles, David Blanco,39 Cados lturralde, Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada, Julio

Leon Prado, Luis Eduardo Siles, Carlos Calvo, Fernando manes, and Jose Luis Camacho, were
invited to disc1!lsS t.he endeavor.

Some of these men were Ministers who helped launch former

Accion was founded in the 1961 as a student-nm volunteer effort in Caracas, Venezuela. Although its initial efforts did
not focus exclusively on microcredit, its current focus is community development vis-ii-VIS microcredit.

.IS
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President Victor paz's Economic Policy and future (today's acting) President Gomalo Sanchez de
Lozada political and economic platforms. At the negotiating table Duncan proposed the microcredit
project and solicited their participation and investment.

At the meeting, Duncan presented a

feasibility study by Robert Peck Christen, micTofinance specialists, which said that the restoration of
monetary stability in Bolivia ensured the success of the microfinance program.
The Bolivian businessmen were initially quite skeptical of the project.
concept to them and

~hey

It was a foreign

bad DO real proof that microcredit was a sound econonUc lio\,:esbnent. HIst,

the businessmen questioned the high interest rates. They appeared scandalous in comparison to the
much lower interest rates offeredl 8.t banks. How were they gOling to make loans 10 poor people at
such high interest rates'? Who would accept such conditions? The businessmen concluded that the
poor would agree interest rates higher than traditional banks, because when in need of money, the
poor would accept outrageous offers from loan sharks. Second, they were uncertain that microcredit
was the market solution to their economic problems. Because microcredit was unfamiliar territory,
there were fears that microcredit would harm rather than help the situation of the poor because of
indebtedness. Pledging support would not only be a financial risk but also a social risk as well. No
one wanted their name attached to a development strategy that resulted in greater poverty and social
unrest.
Duncan seemed to have picked his first investors carefully, despite their doubts. These men
were strong advocates of the neoliberal model and belonged to the same business class that did not
profit during the state developmental era.

They had witnessed bow the state-developmentalism

stifled investment, and the micr·)credit model offered a new solution.

The probable success of

microcredit to be a profitable investment was high. Being optimistic, Bolivian investors thought that
perhaps the poor would be attracted by their access to additional funds; perhaps the solidarity method
would work; perhaps this model would mean overall economic development for the Bolivian nation.

)9

David Blanco served as the Minister of Finance under the Banzer regime.
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They agreed to invest several thousand dollars each, totaling $80,000. Acci6n and the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) invested $560,000. 40

PRODEM, a non

governmental organization launched its microeredit program.

PRODEM's First Donors
Table 4.1

INVESTOR
USAID
Individual Investors

COUNTRY OF
ORIGIN
Uni'tedl States of
America
Bolivia

AMOUNT
(SUSD)
$560,000
$80,000

$640,000

TOTAL

Source: Rhyne, Elisabeth. 200 J. Mainstreaming Microfinance: How
Lending to~the Poor Began. Grew, and Came orAge in Bolivirl.
Bloomfield. Cf: Kumarian Press. Inc. p. 63, 105.

Pancho Otero was hired as the executive director of the new rnicrofinance institution. He had
worked in rural Bolivia as a credit officer and had a lot to offer.
microcred~t

He not only understood the

mode'l well, but he also felt a personal commitment to the project. Otero believed in

microcredit and was committed to helping the poor. Mario Usnayo, an experienced microcredit loan
officer, and Monica Velasco joined Otero in the microcredit effort. These three individuals made up
PRODEM's first management team.

Unl'ike a formal banking institution, Otero, Usnayo, and

Velasco chose PRODEM's first employees to be young men and women (mostly sOldents fresh out
of the university) that were passionate about their project-helping poor people to help themselves.
For Otero, it was not all about the bottom ~ine (even though the bottom line was inherently important
for financial viabihty) but rather his and others' obligation to make a difference in the lives of
Bolirvian

pOOr.

41

PRODEM's middle class management team had been convinced by the simplicity

of microcredit theo,ry and was persuaded by an alternative development that neither had links to state

4'1ulyne Elisabeth. 200 I. MainstreamingMicrofinance: How Lending to the Poor Began. Grew. and Came of Age in
Bohvia. Bloomfi.eld, CT: Kumarian Press. Inc. p. 105.
41 Rhyne, Elisabeth. 2001. Mainstreaming Mi~finance: How Lending to the Poor Began. Grew. and Came of Age in
Bolivia. Bloomfield, CT: Kurnarian Press, Inc. p. 65.
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developmentalism nor socialist thought.

They believed microcredit would alleviate the poverty

created by neoliberal adjustments.
Taking into account the new concept of microcredit, the entire staff had to be taught
solidarity group lending. Bill Tucker, who was developing Accion's Peruvian microcredit program,
came to Bolivia to teach them how to make solidarity group loans work. The team of technocrats
and young people began the lending process, both sides deeply invested in the project, with distinct
skills to offer. When aU technical and financial aspects were finali2ed, PRODEM opened its doors.
Interestingly, PRODEM initially had a difficult time finding clients who wanted a loan.
When PRODEM first opened its doors, nobody walked through them.

Consequently the

management team and employees hit the streets and tried to recruit poor people who would benefit
from the ioan. AU, howev,er, was not to, be as easy as it seemed, and it was not until February 1987
that PRODEM issued its first loan.

.E1isabeth Rhyne, recounts Mario Usrnayo's recollection of

PRODEM's initial efforts:
We went to the poorest people in the market. They wouldn't believe us and wouldn't
come. We went Ito the ne~t poorest people. After some promotional activities, we
waited, looking out the window, but only a few peopl:e straggled in. So we decided te
go to an association. We ·chose the Asociaci6n de Conterciantes Rodriguez, a group
of fruit and vegetabl'e vendors ... We succeeded in convincing four groups of five
people to come together, and made our first set of loans to twenty people. That was
the last promotional work we bad to do. From that point on, word of mouth brought
people to US. 42
From the

onse~

loan officers worked very closely with their clients. Largely motivated by Otero,

loan officers felt that the work they did was rewarding. They felt they believed that access to capital
was the way to better the lives of the poor. In the initial meetings with potential clients, PRODEM
officers explained what 'the organization expected of them (m Spanish, these talks were called

char/as). They made sure the cl·ients knew that PRODEM did not have any religious or political
affiliation and would not treat clients differently based on any of these criteria. They emphasized the

'2

Ibid, 67.
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definition of solidarity and that in all things, the clients had to be bonest and understand that the
group loan was a social obligation. Solidarity was no longer associated with ideas of a collective
voice and cooperation as it had in the past but rather with an obligation of economic interdependence.
Lesley Gill notes:
Solidarity [became]' synonymous with debt repayment, and social' relationship within
the individual groups are frequently strained by the resentment and hostility directed
at those wbo fail to make timely payments,. More generaHy. differences between the
poor and the truly destitute a re reinforced, and fr'eedom comes to mean having as
much money as possible in your pocket,43
Solidarity was no longer defined as collectivism but rather as competition and individualism.
The term "solidarity" now has the ,potential to lead to the deterioration rather than the
preservation of important social relations.
Loan officers at PRODEM stood out from other loan officers at other lending institutions.
The personal relationship that emerged during the loan transaction (from distribution to repayment)
contributed to

develop~ng

the relationship between the client and the institution.

Loan officers

encouraged clients to invest their money in their businesses and to use good management skins so the
credit would bring the greatest returns. In conunittee meetings with other PRODEM employees, loan
officers had to prove their cli.ents demonstrated an ability to pay back the loan. In doubtful cases
loan officers would champion the cases of their clients, insisting '<this or that" demonstrated "good
client" status. Lean officers did not go to such lengths because they received monetary incentives for
their efforts but ratJler because in such cases, they honestly believed that their client would come'
through with payment. Loan officers believed in their clients and their businesses and worked with
their clients until the loan transaction was a completed success. They worked so diligently because it
was not only important for good for the institution bm also because there was a, genuine .interest in
helping poor people.

~J Gill, Lesley. 1997(b). "Relocating Class: Ex-Miners and Neolibetlilism in Bolivia'" in Critique of
Anthropology ( I 7)3: 306.
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PRODEM constantly worked with the proposed model introduced by Acci6n and adapted it
to the Bolivian case. For example, repayment scheduling had to be adapted to the ''rhythm of the

market:>44 Upon the realization that repayment on Fridays was an inconvenience to market vendors,
PRODEM rescheduled. One loan officer notes:
One day it hit us. Market vendors bought on the days the big trucks came
Wednesdays and Fridays. They sold over the weekend. On Mondays they had
money. So we switched the schedule. Monday mornings for repayment, then
disbursement on Tuesday mornings. We hit the nail on the head with this because it
really fit the market. 45
The new repayment schedule also made it easier for officers to follow-up on defaulted payments on
Tuesday mornings, neither a busy market day nor the day of produce .arrivals.
PRODEM did not create separate depamnents for loan distribution and loan repayment,
which may bave resulted in allowing for such consistent loan repayment

Distinct from banks,

PRODEM concluded that t he loan 0 fficer must truly be dI edic.ated to h is/iher case, because b e/she
would have to ensure the loan until the very end. In fact, if a client was unable to payor defaulted on
the loan (assuming the solidarity model did not kick in), the ioan officer went to the client's work site
and investigated the reason for lack of payment. By connecting distribution with repayment vis-a-vis
loan officers, the loan process was not only much more personal, but also these linkages also allowed
for proved. to lessen the amount of repayment default
From its initial distribution of loans, PRODEM was a model of success. In six months it
claimed 700 clients, a waiting list, and zero default rate,

Consistent with the solidarity model,

PRODEM's clients' first loans amounted to $50 with a 2-month repayment plan. Subsequent loans
were $100 and $200 with extended repayment tenDs. Interest rates were fixed at 2.5 percent per
month, and clients were obligated to allocate the first 5 percent of the loan in savings. In accordance
with m icrocredit lending p attems, the majority (85%) ofP RODEM's clients were women market
~ Rhyne, Elisabeth. 2001. Mainstreaming Microfinance: How Lending to the .Poor Began, Grew. and Came of Age in
Bolivia. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press,
p. 70.

me.
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vendors. 46 By the end of 1991, PRODEM was a stellar example of microcredit success not only in
Bolivia but also in all of Latin America. It had issued 22,700 loans and its loan portfolio had reached
$4.6 million. Its clientele load was increasing at 50 percent a year and the default rate remained
remarkably low. Its geographical reach included eleven branches, many of them located in poor
neighborhoods. 47 PRODEM made the microcredit model an uncontested success.
How did PRODEM achieve such remarkable success? In fact, the PRODEM success story is
truly "one-in-a-million," because not a 11 m icrofinance 0 rganizations can claim equivalent success.
Perhaps the most important factor that accounts for PRODEM success is timing. The introduction of
microcredit in the mid·1980s was without a doubt a time when free-market policies worked in the
favor of foreign investment. So although paz's Economic Policy excluded the informal sector, it
created the necessary conditions-immense poverty and neoliberal economics--for the introduction
of microcredit. In the politically and economically "unstable" environment, investors would not
benefit from the Bolivian system.

If the market had maintained state developmental policies,

protectionism would have undermined the microcredit initiative, choking competition and ultimately
leading to· financial failure.

Neoliberalism provided an irresistible opportunity to provide an

alternative, non-governmental plan of "development." Yet as noted in Chapter two, this initiative
was not truly motivated by a concern for the poor, because poverty was the byproducts of neoliberal
adjustments. Instead, microcredit was an open opportunity for the rich to invest money in a new
endeavor that would exploit poverty in order to make money.
As early as 1988 the tremendous growth experienced by PRODEM led to the proposal of
microcredit commercialization. Once again, embarking on an uncharted course, PRODEM investors
concluded that commercialization of microcredit was' in the best interest of the institution. These
businessmen publicly claimed that they wanted to reach more people with more loans, because it was
~Thid. 71.
46

Ibid, 69.
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"good for the people." The more likely reason is that commercialization would reach more clients,
accrue more loans, and result in greater profits for them. That is commercialization would result in a
bigger investment opportunity.

The next section discusses the founding of Bolivia's first

microfinance commercial bank, Banco Solidario.
Banco Solidario, S.A.
Banco Solidario (henceforth referred to as BancoSol) was created by PRODEM and founded
In

February 1992.

Because of PRODEM's initial efforts, micro finance institutions' position

underwent major changes. BancoSol was the first of many transfonnations of non-profit NGOs to
privately funded, commercialized microfinance institutions. What motivated these changes? How
did the proposed model differ from PRODEM?
The transfonnarion from an NGO to a commeroild bank was motivated by the constraints of
an NGO by definition.

Non-governmental organizations in the financial sector are non-profit

organizations and have no owners. Unlike other financial institutions, NGOs cannot capture funds
through savings nor invest in money markets. This posed a problem for P RODEM. In 0 rderto
expand it needed access to more capital, which was only available through additional donor funds.
So why not just continue to seek donor contributions?

First, donor funds from international

organization and wealth business were not always available. Without these funds, new loans could
not be issued, and PRODEM did not want to run the risk of stagnation. As a private

institutio~

PRODEM could gain access to capital from diverse credit lines at low interest rates, including the
Central Bank of Bolivia, which would reduce the risk of capital shonage. 4S Second, PRODEM's
non-ownership structure did not seek to make money, but the proposed model would. The proposed
model would provoke competition as a formal financial institution.

Ibid, 77.
White, Victoria and Anita Campion. 2002. "Transformation: Journey from NGO 10 Regulated MFI" in Deborah Drake
and Elisabeth Rhyne Eds. The Commercialization of Microcredit: Balancing Business and Development. Bloomfield. CT:
Kumanan Press, Inc. p. 23.
47
48
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PRODEM also wanted to offer a wider array of customer services. Savings were important
to microborrowers, but PRODEM was only authorized to supply savings on a compulsory rather than
voluntary basis. So, while clients were able to save some money (5% of the initial loan amount),
they could not make voluntarily deposits. If PRODEM could capture voluntary savings then they
could then use this freed up capital to expand its efforts. As it stood, growth would stagnate when
donor funds expired. In short, PRODEM needed access to competitive financial markets in order to
reach its desired scope.
The new model sought to solve these problems. The new model-commercialization of
microcredit-would provoke competition, attracting investors to become part owners. PRODEM
had already proved that microcredit was a financially viable business, so the only thing that it lacked
was the ownership model in order to resolve the problem of having to seek grants from donors.
Competition and expansion of microcredit would decrease the moral hazard of making poverty a
profitable business. Disengagement from the non-profit model was perceived as the answer to the
problem. The first microfinance commercial ba.nk, Banco Solidario, was to be born.

In order to reach its objectives, PRODEM had to find new ways to fulfill the increasing
demands of its Iportfolio. So a· planning committee was assembled-Comminee for the Promotion of
the Bank for Microenterpnses49 (COBANCO)-to assist the transformation task.

COBANCO's

chairman and! PRODEM's board director, Fernando Romero, led PRODEM in investigating the costs
and benefits of such an endeavot'.

COBANCO received assistance from BancoSol investors,

Calmeadow Foundation and Accion International. First, COBANCO looked at financial feasibility
studies. The first proposal sought to procure funds vis-a.-vis subsidized Joans from the Central Bank
of Bolivia. Th.s proposal was rejected and the new and accepted! one would raise capital by selling
bank shares to pn1vate local a nd

intemationa~

investors. Shareholding made the new commercial

bank a viable investment option for its mvestors.
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Second, COBANCO had to meet the legal requirements of a commercial bank.

The

Superintendency of Banks required a minlinurn capital investment of $3.2 million, which meant
attracting investors with a lot of money. The new bank's principal investor would come from the
portfolio of PRODEM, making PRODEM a shareholder.

PRODEM, however, was a non-profit

organization; its money came from donors and U.S. taxpayer dollars.

Was it lawful for the

PRODEM to embark on an endeavor that would capitalize on donor funds? The grant agreement
between PRODEM and USAID restricted PRODEM from using the funds for any other purposes
besides their original ones, which were designated for social objectives. Yet because the money was
given to PRODEM and technically no longer belonged to USAID, then taxpayer dollars were not
being spent. Eventually the U.S. detennined that the portfolio transfer was lawful because the initial
government funds that were lent had been repaid. Thus the funds were really no longer taxpayers
dollars and could be used as the government chose. 50

Non-Profit Transaction
Table 4.2

I

DONOR

H

m

HNGO

~

t
PRODEM sold the portfolios of its most viable clients to BancoSol in return for shares. The sold
portfolio totaled $1.4 million, which gave PRODEM a 41 % share in BancoSol. Other sharehoMers
included Bolivian businessmen (25% share) and foreign development organizations.

In Spanish, Comite Promotor del Banco para la Microempresa.
White, Victoria and Anita Campion. 2002. "Transfonnation: Jowney from an NGO 10 RegulaJed MFj.;; in Deborah
Drake and Elisabeth Rhyne, Eds. The CommerciaJizat;ion of Microfinance: balancing' Business with Development.
Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, Inc. p. 40.
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The fact that BancoSol's largest shareholder was an NGO made the Superintendency of
Banks leery.

The Superintendency questioned what role PRODEM would have in BancoSol's

decision-making. It feared that an NGO's agenda would dominate BancoSol's agenda. Past bank
failures made the Superintendency leery of such a close relationship between the two institutions,
because above all, the Superintendency was concerned about the bank's financial stability.

If

PRODEM was to influence the bank, the Superintendency had to be sure operations placed a greater
emphasis on financial viability than social programs, such as training and management skills for
clients. COBANCO convinced the Superintendency that NGO involvement would not hinder the
bank's most important mission of financial viability.
Banco Solidario Shareholders (J! 992)
I

Table 4.3
I SHAREHOLDERS

I PRODEM

Inter-American Investment
Corporation
Bolivian businessmen
Aceion International
Calmeadow Foundation
Fundes
Rockefeller Foundation
SIDI

TOTAL

COUNTRY OF
ORIGIN
Bolivia
I Multiple countries
Bolivia
I United States
Canada
Switzerland
United States
France

AMOUNT
(lJSD)
~
1,400,000

NID
],000,000
900,000

200,000
150,000

>3.650.000

Source: Rhyne. Elisabeth. 2001. Ma;nstreaminr:-Micro{inance: How Lending to the Poor Began.
Grew and Came ofAfre in Bolivia. BLoomfield, CT: Kumarian Press. Inc.p. 11O.

Tbroughout transformation, COBANCO and the Slllperintendency worked very closely, focusing on
the legal procedures of establishing and maintaining a microcredit 'cornmercialbank.
The Superintendency of Banks was also very dubious of the solidarity model. Financial
regulations did not consider the solidarity model as offering sufficient collateral.

The

Superintendency required movable assets, such as liens on property, in order to insure the loan. This

meant that the new bank would have to secure every solidarity loan it issued with reserves of 100%.
For BancoSol this would be an impossible task because nearly all of its loans would have to be
covered by reserves.

BancoSol went on to convince the Superintendency that solidarity group

lending should be considered sufficient collateral, pointing at the success of solidarity loans in
PRODEM. The Superintendency was able to reach a compromise with BancoSoJ, allowing it to
issue solidarity loans of $2000 or less without the need of secwing' these loans with reserves. The
Superintendency also issued other regulations regarding administrative tasks such as repoIi!ing profit
and Joss accounts, taxation, and other security measures. 51
Advocates of NGO transformation felt that regulation by the Superintendency was a gfeat
accomplishment. Regulation was supposed to legitimize ,the microfi..nance sector as a competitive
market economy, and therefore attract private investment.

Recognized as a formall financial

institution, BancoSoI began operating on February 10, 1992 in the San P,edro neighborhood.
Transformation did result in the desired effects.

Transfonnati'On allowed microfinance

institutions attracted clients with a better array of services.. especially the savings ,account feature.
Microfinance institutions had effectively stimulated a higher level of client panicipation in savings
deposits. In turn, as stated earlier, the deposits made more capital available in order to reach more
people. The cyclical name of the rnicroooance, model is quite consistent with BancoSol's
promotional logo that states, "We grow together."S2 The logo emphasizes Ithe interdependence of
client participation in microcredit and microcredit interest in dient participation in order Ito realize
"development" in both sectors. Yet there is no evidence that the client and the institutions are truly
growing together. Microfmance institutions are indeed profitable and the money purses of investors
are enlarging, but the indicators of poverty alleviation are yet to be proven.

Katsuma, Yasushi. 1997. "Trnnsforming an NGO into a Commercial Bank to Expand Financial Services for the
Microenterpnses of Low-Income People: PRODEM and Banco Solidario (BancoSol) in Bolivia" in Technology and
Development, No. 10, p. 77.
52 In Spanish, Juntos crecemos.

51
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The most profound and immediate effect was the fast commercialization of microcredit into
the financial economic system. The foundation ofBancoSol certainly provoked competition, and
only months later, the Superintendency of Banks and other NGOs were working together to replicate
the BancoSol success. "The Superintendency saw the need to define a new category for microcredit
lending institutions.

Working in conjunction with Interdizciplinare Projekt Consult (!PC), the

Superintendency reviewed several proposals. These proposals included banking houses that would be
owned hy municipal governments and departmental banks.

Both these proposals were rejected.

Banking houses and departmental banks would not far-reaching enough. They appealed only to
politicians who courd use financial services as an appealing device to their constituenci.es.

In

addition, it was felt that restricting lendiJng institutions to certaio jurisdictions would resuh in a lack
of competition. The mood that was finally agreed upon was Fondo Financiero Privado (FFP).S3

FFPs would act as financia.I intermediaries for microenterptises and would abide by the regulations
of the Superintendency.

These regulations included: 1) a minimwn capital of $1 million for

foundation; 2) comparable .regulatory norms as banks (ie. ownership structure, portfolio quality,
I,iquidity, internal control, and timitations against insider lending) and; 3) restrictions from servicing
foreign trade, credit cards, checking accounts, and trust funds.

The Supreme Decree 24000 of

President Gonzalo Sanchez de Iu:>zada endorsed these regulations in May 1995, and FFPs were
integrated ,into the financiall system.

Caj'a Los Andes. FFP
Caja Los Andes was the first microfinance institution to be given a FFP license in July 1995.
Caja Los Andes, however, was also preceded by the work of an NGO, ProCredito.

Claus-Peter

Zeitinger. founder of IPC, established ProCredito in 1986 with the foremost intention of converting it
into a

forma~

.financial institution and capturing funds from the Inter-American Development Bank

(IDB), a principal internationall donor for microfinance development projects. And indeed he did.

H

In English, Private Financial Fund.
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The German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), the Swiss Development Cooperation, the IDB, and the
An

m Development Fund provided Procrewto's initial funding.

Procredito became the first

competitor to challenge Acci6n International's monop<>ly of microfinance initiative funds for Latin
America.
Similar to the PRODEM-BancoSol transformation, ProCredito transferred its portfolio Caja
Los Andes and became the chief investor, owning nearly half of all the shares.

Caja Los Andes Shareholders (1995)
Table 4..4
SHAREHOLDER
Procredito
Swiss Technical COJ1)oration
Andean Development Fund'4
I Private, individual investors

COUNTRY OF
ORIGIN
Bolivia
Switzerland
I Multil'ateral organization
----------~----

I %

I

OWNERSHIP
40%
40%
20%

I Source: Rhyne, Elisabeth. ZOO/. Mai'lSlreamiht: Microfinance: How Lending to the Poor Began. I
Grew and Came ofAve in Bolivia. Bloomfield. CT Kumarian Press, Inc. f). 127.

Caja Los Andes focuses on individual rather than solidarity lending. ZeitJinger believes that
solidarity lending is not the best lending model to ensure microfimUlce profitability. He claims that
the individual lending model is preferred over the solidarity model because ,clients do not want the
financial burden of guaranteeing others. This decision to choose the individual lending model over
the solidarity model, however, implies an important shift about who microcredit reaches.

The

requirements of an individual loan at Caja Los Andes (as pointed out in Chapter one) list that the
client can guarantee his/her loan by putting a lien on movable assets. If the client does not have
sufficient collateral, then another person must guarantee the loan with assets worth the amount of the
loan. The importance placed on the lien is most assuredly a move towards the same requirements of
traditional banks, which have excluded the poor in the past. Was this not the original reason why
clients could Dot get credit from banks?

How many poor people have movable assets?

The
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implications for this shift are obvious. The poorest client that cannot find a guarantor that meets
those qualifications and therefore cannot receive credit.
Today, Caja Los Andes profits are quicldy reaching comparable levels as BancoSol's, and
competition is fierce between the institutions, each trying to outdo the other in net gains. Zeitinger
attributes Caja Los Andes' financial success to the individual loan model. BancoSol seems to be
catching on quite quickly and has come to the conclusion. BancoSol reported in its 2001 Annual
Report:
The dOWlilsizing of the Solidario loan portfolio results from the preference for
individual loans shown by clients, as well as from a strategic management decision to
lower the concentration of the total loan portfolio in Sol'idarity loans, given that
during the econ.onUc slowdown solidarity guarantees are not effective. ss
My visit to BancoSol confirnted this policy change. When I asked the loan officer the possibility of
taking out a solidarity loan, she replied, "No. You the individual loan would be best in your case."
Eliminating the solidarity loan is a protective measure taken by the banks to ensure ongoing
profits. In all },ilce1ihood, tn a few years solidarity loans. will no longer exist. Microfinance continues
to take more steps towards reaching the "best" poor-those from whom the bank profits mostrather than targeting those tbatare in dire need. Zeitinger's claim that dientele demand motivates
microcredit decisions is very doubtfuL The true picture of microcredit decision-making is motivated
by the interests of inves.toFS to protect their capirta1l from bad investments.

Besides if microfinance

institutions wanted to meet clientele demand than they would have to provide basic needs sucb as
sufficient food, health care, education., and employment to all the poor and not a "selective"

]!)OOl'.

Microcredit is looking for profits, and instead of "growing together" the poor remain poor while lthe
rich get richer. Yet is not this the same old, sad story ofLatio America?
Center for the Promotion of Economic Initiatives (fIE), FEP

5<
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In Spanish, Ccrporaci6n Andino de Fomento (CAF).
Banco Solidario, SA. 2001. Annual Report, II.
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FIE NGO was established by M. Pilar Ramirez.

Educated at Harvard University, Pilar

Ramirez sought out a program that was distinct from food aid programs, whicb sbe thought were
highly ineffective and demeaning. FIE began microcredit operation in 1985 under the auspices of
Oxfam America, a privately funded U.S.-based organization "dedicated to creating lasting solutions
to hunger, poverty, and social injustice.,,56 FIE's first project was a knitting and sewing company in

rural Bolivia.

This project was dismissed because it lacked market orientation, demonstrated

management and ownership problems, and assisted few people at high administrative costs. FIE's
next project, funded by the InterwAmerican Foundation, was working with unemployed miners and
teach them new skills sucb as machinery repair, carpentry, fishing, poultry, and raising livestock. Yet
this project was still not far-reaching enough for FIE.

In 1988 FIE received funding to do

microfinance project in an urban area, and from there FIE began to see increasing profits.
On March 16, 1998 FIE received its license as a Fondo Firumciero Privado. Pilar Ramirez,

acting President, targeted microcredit for the manufacturing industry. She believed that it was more
important to give money to offer credit to those who provide a productive base for economic
development Eventually she also opened up credit opportunities to the commercial sector because
women who were primarily market vendors were being excluded.

FIE Shareholders (1998)
Table 4.5

SHAREHOLDER

COUNTRY

FIE
Bolivian businessmen
Swiss Development Corporation

Bolivia
Bolivia
Switzerland

% OWNERSHIP

OF ORIGIN
60%
30%
10%

Source: Rhyne, Elisabeth. lQOI. Mainstream;ng Mkrofinance: How Lending (0 (he
Poor Began, Grell', al'ld Come orAge in Bolivia. Bloomfield, cr: Kumarian Press, Inc.
p.12/.

)6

Oxfam America. http://www.oltfamamerica.orglaboutlar(46)O.html (Accessed April 2) • 2003).
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Like Zeitinger, Ramirez was also skeptical of the solidarity model. She labeled the model as
paternalistic and declared that it forced clients to put themselves in financial jeopardy vis-a-vis
interdependence. As in the earlier days of FIE, Ramirez still believed that enterprise development
would be the result of hands-on training. She incorporated a training program into the microcredit
model. The training focused on topics such as management skills and investment tips that were
aimed at enhancing the client enterprises.

Training was eventually dismissed first, because it

revealed to have little difference in the productivity levels of the clients, and second because clients
disliked completing the one-month training session before receiving credit. Training, if any, now
spans four days and is considered a -separate department than that of credit.
While FIE places a greater emphasis on serving the manufucturing sectors, it processes loans
for the commercial and service sectors as well. This distinction is imponant to microcredit, because
it chooses to extend credit to those that have access to productive resources.

In the service and

commercial sectors, there is little room for growth: Each day these markets grow more competitive.
It can be argued that the manufacturing sector is the best sector in which money should be invested,
because there is a potentiall for growth, which could translate into the creation of more jobs. This is
not to say that growth in the manufacturing sector is going to solve poverty, because it most
definitely will not. Yet, unlike the commercial and service sectors, manufacturing is producing; and
therefore it has a greater chance of providing a base for economic growth in Bolivia. This theory,
however, is just that-a theory. In practice the manufacturing sector of the informal economy has
not yet demonstrated these results. Moreover, these small micro:"manufacturing industries may never
be viable enough to provide workers' benefits, etc. And yet again, supporting the "poor but not too
poor" microborrower contradicts the microcredit claim of COrnrn1'OTlent to the poor.

PRODEM, FFP
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In addition to BancoSol, PRODEM NGO established its own FFP with the new and viable
portfolios accumulated from 1992 to 1998. PRODEM FFP license was granted on December 28,
1999, and it began operating in January 2000. Its lead owner is PRODEM NOO.
CONCLUSION
NGO transformation has led microfinance in a direction distinct from the work of its
founding NGO. Transformation has placed a new emphasis on the profitability of microfinance
institutions rather than the scantily defined "social commitment" to the poor. The Superintendency of
Banks not only regulates microfinance practices but it aJlso defines what microfinance success is.
The Superintendency of Banks is not concerned with whether or not conunercialization is a sound
social decision but rather a sound financial practice.

PRODEM.'s performance and later on the

establishment of BancoSol served as the proof of that success.
Organizations such as the World Bank, USAID, and the Inter-American Development Bank
claim that the transition from NGO to private institution has not only met the financial viability goal
but also the social goal. Claiming microcredit was already a good method to alleviate poverty; it is
believed that expansion of this method could only be seen in a positive light. Enlarging microcredit
to include other services and branching out geographically allow more poor people access to

microcredit

Microfinance institutions operate offices from in neighborhoods all over the city,

making access more readily available than ever before.
Both investor and NGOs claim that transfonnation was a success.

International investors

such as USAID, Acci6n International, Inter-American Development Bank., amongst others embraced
the new definition of success as profitability as they discovered NGO transformation made
microcredit marketable. Microfinance demonstrated good prospects for growth. A$ stated earlier on
in this chapter, commercialization was assisted by easy loan portfolio transferal and ownership

model. First, microfinance institutions did not have to go looking for new clients. NGOs offered
clients that already had loans and had showed consistent repayment records. Second, NGOs would
61

still be part owners and place a role in decision making that ensure the plight of the poor remained
the focus of lending strategies. It is believed that the role of the NGO in the private institution will
serve to assist the bank with the technicalities of preserving the aim of microfinance, which is
reaching the microentrepreneur. Former NGO board members would take seats on the board of the
new institution, corresponding to the NGO's percent ownership.

NGO presence was necessary

because Bolivian bankers were financial analysts who }mew only the technicalities of how to run a
bank.

The perspective of banking specialists would not place enough emphasis on improving

microfinance operations beyond measures of financial gain. The NGO would serve as the vanguard
against microcredit finance deviation away from social works. While these assumptions may have
been true at the onset of NGO transfonnation, the role of NGOs in microfinance is quite different
today. Taking a more in depth look at the ownership model, one can clearly see that microfinance
investment offers shareholders an opportunity to gain returns on their capital. One can no longer
assume that microcredit is all about "good works," because in reality, there is money to be earned in
microfinance investments.
The shareholders of microfinance institutions consist of private and public-private investors.
Private investors in Bolivia include businessmen whom have been willing to risk small amounts of
capital in microcre<tit. M any of the private investors in Bolivia were among the first to endorse
microcredit when it began its work as a small NGO. While these investors did not believe that
microfinance would have huge returns, they had been willing to give the microfinance model a try.
Today microfinance has proven that it would be a good investment, but private investors---especially
native Bolivians-still account for a very small percentage of ownership.
investment if microfinance is a profitable economic model?

What deters private

Private investors are deterred from

investment, because they feel that their contribution would not give them enough leverage to shape
the mission of the institution. The fact that NGOs still own the majority of the shares give private

62

investors linle incentive to believe that they could introduce new methods that may compromise the
NGO's commitment to prioritizing profitability.s7
Public-private investors are defined as specialized partnerships that capitalize funds vis-a-vis
the public sector, but whose funds are managed and treated as private commercial money.58
Break..ing this definition down, public investors may be microfmance institutions (MFls) or non-profit
organizations. The private investor is usually an international financial institution (lFl). A foreign
private investor may represent the interests of multilateral, bilateral, or unilateral actors, including
development agencies.

Partnerships between the private and public sectors are the result of the

increased interest of international institutions in microfmance.
arrangement applies to the Bolivian transformation caseS..

The specialized partnership

For example, USAID and Accion

International are the private investors, and PRODEM is the public investor. This partnership allows
for the appearance that PRODEM was profiting, whille in reality USAID manages the profits as
private commercial funds.

Pu blic-P riv ate Pa,rtnersbip
Table 4.6

Momrnartz et al. 59 mentions that most private investors chose Flot to take

all

active role with

microfinance instirutions, but rather remain "silent partners" and pray a passive role. Mommartz

}) White, Victoria and Anita Campiol1. 2002. "Transformation: Journey from an NOD to Regulated MFI" in Deborah
Drake aDd ,Elisabeth 'Rhyne, Eds. The O:lmmerdaJization of Microfinance: Balaneing Bwiness with Development..
Bloomfield, CT; Kumarian Press, Inc. p. 37

~ MQrnmartz, Rochus and Gabriel Schor. 2002. "The Role of Specialized Investors in Commercialization" in Deborah
Drake and Elisabeth Rhyne, F.:ds. The CommeFCialization of Mlcrofinancc: balancing Business with .Devdopment.
Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press, lnc. p. 29.
'9
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cites four main reasons why this might be the case: (1) private investors are unwilling to bear the
costs that active ownership entails; (2) private investors are politically motivated not to intervene; (3)
private investors have no business strategy for the institution; and (4) private investors lack the
technical skills to make an active contribution. 60 Applying these reasons to the Bolivian case and
U.S. foreign investors specifically, it may be said that USAID and Aceion may act as silent partners
because they are unwilling to bear the costs of active ownership and are also politically motivated not
to intervene. The other two reasons-no business strategy and lack of technical skills-are certainly
not applicable to the Bolivian case.
Individual investors refrain from microfinance investment, not only because they feel they
have no leverage in decision-making, but also because of the immoral stigma attached to a
development project in which the rich make money off from the poor. This same rationale, which I
will refer to as moral hazard, can be applied to foreign investors who have detached their names from
micl'ofinance investment.

This tactic is significantly advantageous for investors, because if

microfinance fails then it is the public image of the FFP, which is attacked rather than the real faces
behind the scenes-USAID and Accion. The microfinance crisis of 1999 is a great example of this
taking place.
[n

1999 microboITowers began to borrow money from multiple microfinance institutions

mostly from consumer lending institutions but not exclusively. The process was quick and easy; if
they were unable to pay back a. loan to Caja Los Andes then they would just borrow from BancoSol.
When clients could no longer juggle t beir loan payments a mongstt he v CliriouS institutions, c bents
began to default 0 n t heir loans. I n turn, m icrofinance institutions did 1il ot have S U1fficient enough
reserve to cover these loans, as they had petitioned to the Superintendency of Banks for 0% reserve
on loans of less than $2000. The situation turned ugly as poor people grew more and more indebted.
Clients defaulted on their loans, iJ'lterest rates increased, and there was no money to pay back the

60

Mommanz et al. 2002: 82.
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loans.

Protestors marched to the Superintendency of Banks with bombs strnpped to their backs.

They demanded debt forgiveness and demanded that the Superintendency intervene on their bebalf. 61
The fact that Latin American governments are known to intervene in the market has made the U.S.
keep a low profile regarding its investments

m the

microfinance industry.

Therefore if the

microfinance markets enter in crisis and people demand debt forgiveness, then it is the national
government that must deal with the problem, because

~t

is the national government that should be

regulating m icrofinance institution p raetices. Those who really profit a re able to hide behind the
image of the public sector that bears the brunt of a public attack. The debtor' 5 revolt resulted in the
debt forgiveness of a few cases. The movement J 05t momentum, however, when its I eaders were
imprisoned for the iHegal collection of debt-service payments and the mishandling of membership
dues.
The crisis of 1999 was not just a result multiple lending problems but also the result of
Bolivia's first economic recession after fifteen years of progress. This recession demonstrates the
weaknesses of the rnicrocredit model and its high likelihood of quick collapse. It only took one bad
year and microfinance institutions had begun to talk about mergers. The failure of microfinance
would mean that the poor lose. Their savings deposits would be lost. Enterprises may be forced to
downsize or close because oflow productivity, and credit would not be available to see them through
the hardship. Investors got their "piece of the pie" and for them it is just time to shuffle their capital
around and invest it in something different. Therefore it is obviously politically advantageous for the
U.S. to be able to pulJ out of such operations if its name is not attached.
Does the U.S. b ave the t echnica1 skills tom ake active contributions? T he answer tot his
question is yes. The U.S. funds academic scholars, NGOs such as FundaPro, Asofin , and Finrural,

61 This kind of tactic is nothing new in Latin America. During economic crisis, Latin American
governments-and Bolivia is no exception-have been known to politicize the banking sector as the cause of
the problem. These same governments have had to intervene and require banks to defer debts.
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and government organizations such as USAID to pursue research that ensures microfinance
profitability. Accion International, a prominent foreign investor for microfinance operations in Latin
America, unquestionably bas the technical skills to make active contributions. For this reason alone
it has insisted on having a position on the board of directors of its microfinance institutions. In short,
there is plenty of skill to go around. U.S. governmental and non-governmental organizations have a
clear idea about how to keep microfinance moving in the desired direction.
Does the U.S. have a business strategy for microfinance institutions?

The U.S. most

definitely has a business strategy for microfinance in Bolivia. While U.S. initial engagement in
microfinance was a "testing of the waters," subsequent engagement was clearly heightened because
of PRODEM's phenomenal success. The U.S. and other ,international

,~nvestors

do not perceive

microcredit objectives in light of a development strategy for the poor but as the means to mask a
profitable venture in the name of "development." The U.S. strategy is to maintain microfinance
profitability with few political' costs, and thus far it bas been doing a reputable job.
Transformation has outlined new goals and redefined the concept of microcredit success.
The new indicator of success is profits not social works. Perhaps mic:rocredit was not about social
works to begin with.

The following chapter presents evidence of the financial success of

microfinance institutions.
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CHAPTER FIVE:
M1CROFINANCE INSTITUTIONS' DEFINITION OF SUCCESS
The new 'terminology that defines rnicrocredit success as profitability is proven. Each year
microfinance bulletins publish statistics that support the ever-growing portfolios of microfinance
institutions. Indeed more clients are being reached and more loans are being issued. In this chapter,
I present the latest information regarding microfinance institution portfolios, pointing to data that

supports this new definition
reach, portfolio

gro~

0

f m icrofinance success. T he m easures for success i nelude clientele

and low delinquency rates.

Following the presentation of microfinance

"success,," 1 present a true picture of who are the real beneficiaries of microcredit.
This chapter also points to an interesting debate between cormnercial and non..commercial
microfinance ffistitUtiOIlS. Other NGOs in Bolivia have purposely opted out of commercialization
because---they cIaim-microfinance has moved away from its objective goal of poverty alleviation
and placed greater emphasis on financial gain. While this argument is similar to the one I posed in
the previous chapter, my conclusion points to the problems of microcredit regardless of its
corrunercial or NGO status.
CLIENTELE REACH
The commercialization of microcredit has met its goal regarding clientele reach. Clients are
lining up outside of microfinance institutions to see if they qualify for a loan.

Microfinance

institutions have satl!lrated the market so completely that they actually must compete to gain the
anention ofchents. Microfinance institutions tty to out do each other by offering new services in
order to attract clients from other institutions to their own. Table 5.1 indicates the difficulty of
keeping clients interested in microcredit.

Client Evolution
Table 5.1
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Number of Clients

Microfmance Institution

December 2001

December 1998
Banco S~'Iidario
Ca!ja Los Andes
FIE
PRODEM
TOTAL

.

'~

61,338
43,530
23,173
*21,386

81,555
32,482
20,848
47,130
182,015

,

-**149427

*denotes December 2002
**PRODEM December 2002 figures are included.
Source: Pedro Arriolp Bonjour. "Micrufinance in Bolivia in Tll1Ies of Crisis. ..
Unpublished paper: BancoSol, Caja Los Antk.$, FIE. PRODEM. 200i. Annual
Reports.

- -

CAJA LOS ANDES CLIENT EVOLUTION

Table 5.2
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Source: Caja Los Andes. 2001. Annual Report, 15.

While Caja Los Andes and fIE have been able to maintain clientele growth, BancoSol and
PRODEM have seen a decline.

BancoSol's decline may be attributed to its shift away from

solidari!ty loans to individual loans. The majority of BanGoSol's clients have been solidarity loans;
perhaps dients are unwilling to put liens on their property in order to receive credit and thus have
opted out of microcredit. This; however, is just a specumatiolil, because it also may be true that
solidarity 'Clients have voluntarily moved from solidarity to Fndividua1 loans;

However, the

administrative ,decision to lower Ithe number of sol!idarity loans as an overall percentage of the loan
portfolio is the most Ilikely reason for clientele movement away from solidarity group lending.
BancoSol Loan Type Evolution
Table 5.3
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Number of Clients
I 0.10 chan!!e I
2000
2001
37,667
21,758
42%
21,066
34,346
63%

Loan Type
I

Solidari,ty

I Individual

I Source: Banco Svlidari(}, S.A.

lOOJ. Annual ReDan, J I.

PRODEM's decline j,n cliente1e growth is probably due to the portfolio transferal in iJ.999. The figure
in Table 5.2 for the year 199,8 indicates the number of clients for PRODEM NGO, because
PRODEM FFP was not yet established. Therefore it can be assumed that upon the establislunent of
PRODEM FFP, its NGO founder did Dot transfer the entire portfolio.
PORTFOLIO EVOLUTION
Consistent with the growth of the clientele portfolio, rniCTOfinance institutions have
experienced notable financial success. They have been able to sustain portfolio growth even in the
event of intense competition from other microfinance institutions and saturation of the market.
Portfolio. Evolution
Table 5.4
Microflnance Institution

r

Banco Solidario
Caia Los Andes

FIE

I

PRODEM

..

Gross Pertfolio (SUSD 000)
Decembe' 1998
December 20tH
74,068 '
81,449
28,6[3
52,634
26,175
14,086
33,628
24,188
..
'.. <:1"40355~ ~~...
. m---:ii6

~~
.
....... .,.
..::ro~AL : ~. .
Source: BaJ1ooSof. Caia Los Andes. FIE. PRODEM. lOO/. Annual ReDons.
.'

~

.'

~

The year in which most microfinance institutions saw a downturn in the clientele reach was in
1999-the most severe year of the ongoing economic recession in Bolivia. However, microfinance
institutions did not suffer nearly as much as traditional banks. Asofin reports that between 1999 and
2001 microfinance institutions lost approximately 4 percent of their clients, while regular banks saw

69

a 23 percent loss in the same 'time period. 62 The fact those micronnance institutions have been able
to "bounce back" makes these institutions quite proud. With these types of statistics. microfinance
can claim that they have achieved in areas traditional banks have not.
Not only have microfinance institutions proven their superiority to traditional banks in
portfolio growth but also in the quality of their portfolio. Microfinance institutions assert that their
careful monitoring of clients has allowed for low delinquency rates.

Table 5.3 illustrates the

delinquency rates. ofmicrofiJilance institutions, which places them above the rates oftraditronal banks
that see delinquency as high as 30 percent for the total portfolio.
Delinquency Rates
Table 5.5

DESCRIPTION

Delinquent Portfolio/ 'f.otal
Portfolio
Rescheduled Delinquent
PortfoliolTota.l Portfolio
Delinquent Clientsl"fotaJ Clients
Rescheduled! Delinquent
Clientsffotal' Credit Chents

I

MICROFINANCE INSTITUTION
Caja Los
FIE
PRODEM

Banco
Solidario
10.23%
I

I

Andes
5.28%

5.98%

5.35%

3.25%

2.68%

7.55%

12.64%
1.81%

15.38%
3.38%

11.62%
11.70%

I

8.38%
n.71%
6.70%

I

I

,

,
Source: ASOFIN. 2002. Balances Generales y Estados de Resultados por la Gestion 2002. Unvublished rf!f)Orl.

I

GEOGRAPHICAL REACH
Meeting all of the aforementioned goaIs--clientele J1each and portfoho growth and quality
microfinance institutions have expanded its reach to departments all over Bolivia. Even though
commercialization began in La Paz, every department now bas its very own microfinance bank or
FFP.

After commercialization was legalized by the Superintendency of Banks, microfinance

Asotin. "Desempeno y desafios de las microfinanz.as en Bolivia." www.abe.eurofull.com/img/JorgeMaclean.hon
{Accessed April. 12. 2003}.
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institutions rushed to open up new branches-each wanting to beat the others in reaching new
clients.

Geographical Reach
Table 5,.6
Departmeoc

'MICROFINANCE INSTITUTION
Banco. Solidario

FIE

'Caja Los Andes

La PuJEI Alto

14

Cochabamba
Santa Cruz
Omro
Chuquisaca
Potosi
Tarija
Bern

8
10
2
2
0
0
0

TOTAL*

36

..

iPRODEM

TOTAL

7
1

13

7

2
0
2
I

4
1
1
1
1
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0

4

.21:

16

SO

9
4'
31
01

43

8

2

,

21

".

24

S

"

4

9
7

6
"

9
5

-

123

"Note: Some o!this information differsfrom the report 0/A<£ojin (12/31/2002). This probably is the resulr of
Ihe .closing and,openi"g a/branches after the printing ofthe 2001 Annual Reports.
Source: BancoSol, Coja Los Andes, FIE, PRODEM. 200'1. Coll«t;on oj,unpublished
advertisementslpCUT/pMelS; Annual Reports.

Table 5.2 demonstrates that as far as expansion goes some institutions have done
significantly beuer than others have.

On the one hand, BancoSol and Caja Los Andes have

purposefully ltargeted the more densely pOpuihlted cities-La paz, Cochabarnba, and Santa Cruz..
BancoSol and Caja Los Andes have opted out of expansion lin less populated departments because of
their focused mission of institutional profitability. Centralization in urban areas cuts the costs of
rnicrofinance operation.s.

Not only do urbanites make the best clients, but also there is a key

advantage of having an office in one location with many clients ratber than several offices with lhe
same amount of clients. ProCredito clearly only lexists in order to hold shares. It does not seek to
"waste" money on rural Bohvia when 'the urban centers bring the best retUrns.
As mentioned earlier, PToCredito was founded with the sole intention of becoming a formal
financial institution. That is, its initial goal was profits. So while ProCredito's doors are technically
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"open" to public, the potential microborrower is aIways redirected to tbe doors of Caja Los Andes.
ProCredito bas made no attempt to reach the rural Pea!S3Dt and essential does nothing but collect the
money it is due as shareholder ofCaja Los Andes.
Distinct from the cases ef BancoSol and Caja Los Andes, 1 believe that it is worthy to note
that it is not clear that all NGOs were founded with the intention of commercialization.
m~crofinance institutions

first

0

ffieers

0

These

seem to !have a greater concern for reaching rural areas. _For example, the

f PRODEM N GO started their m icrofinance work a sloan 0 ffieers in rural Bolivia.

Second, one must bear in mind that these officers believe in the microcredit model. Some even
vocalized their opposition to the commercialization of rnicrocredit.

Perhaps for this reason,

PRODEM NGO has not closed -its door on the possibility of reaching others, particularly rural
peasants. [think that it is worthy to note 'that PRODEM NGO has not excluded the rural sector but
rather continues to implement the rnicrocredit model in rural areas too. This is not to say that the
microcredit model works just because it is in the rural sector; however it is worthy to point out that
PRODEM's beginnings were humble.

There are loan officers that remember this fact and are

commined Ito reaching all poor and not just the ''best'' poor. I believe that these officers represent an
important opposition to economists, financial specialists, and bankers whose sole focus is the bottom
line. FIE is another institution that has continued to show its commitment to reaching the poor in
rural areas.

Pilar Ramirez also began her work in rural Bolivia and is a strong believer in the

microc~edit

model. This may explain FIE's advances toward promotion the microcredit model in

rural Bolivia.
I do not mention the cases of PRODEM and BancoSol to diminish my argument about
commercializatiortl being the means to greater profits for international investors. Yet it is also clear
tfu'at steps taken regarding geographical diversification differ amongst microfinance institutions. I do
suggest, however,. one reason why this might be the case.
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Each year microfinance institutions publish colorful, glossy pages full of data about the
success of the institution.

These annual reports are obviously directed to potential investors.

Microfinance institutions are trying to show how" good" t hey are. T here reports are written like
advertisements. Essentially tbey saw, "Look how many deposits the bank captured! Take note of
our low delinquency rates!" The people who care about this information are future investors. They
want proof that their investtnent to microfinance is going to result in returns. When microfinance
institutions demonstrate substantial growth and "success," private investors are more likely to give
microfinance a chance.

However, annual reports do not indicate microcredit has attracted new

investors. The shareholders are essentially the same ones since the banks opened. This may be
because of two reasons.
On the one Rand and as mentioned earlier, investors may have chosen to opt out of

investment, because they do not think their small investment could make a difference in key policy
decisions.

Perhaps NGOs-the major shareholders-have purposefully boarded their shares,

because microfinance institutions are doing welL

Commercialization may have attracted new

investors, yet NGOs may be unwilling to sell their shares. NGOs may still want to be the key
decision-makers in the microfinance business.
On the other hand, there may be no new interests in microfinance investment because

investors see microfinance as a risky business.

Even though there is "regulation" by the

Superintendency of Banks, it is no secret that the Bolivian government often works in ,conjW1ction
with the rich, covering up their bad business. That was exactly the case for State banks operating in
the 1970s; and the Superintendency was supposedly "regulating" them too.

Investors may see

microfinance as a business that is likely to go under "at the drop of a hat" It very well may be that
NGO shareholders are looking for an exit strategy but are unable to find one without suffering major
loss.

73

The questions are this: Is no one buying or is no one selling? This information would be
difficult to obtain without speaking with the shareholders themselves. But even if it were possible to
get interviews with the major shareholders, with whom would I speak? NGOs have no owners. It is
without question that shareholder profits do not just sit in the NGO, because no one can claim them.
Someone is responsible for making decisions regarding the buying and selling of shares, but the
question is who? NGO shareholding is an ambiguous business, and someone definitely has invested
interests in keeping it that way.
BENEFICIARlES OF MICROCREDIT
The real beneficiaries of microcredit success are the shareholders of the microfinance
institutions. Microfinance institutions provide a list of their shareholders in their annual reports.
Most times the percentage of the shares held by each is also available.

Tables 5.4 through 5.7

provide this information. It is important to know what companies have invested in the future of the
Bolivian poor.

BANCO SOLIDARIO SHAREHOLDERS (2001)
Table 5.7
PRODEMNGO
Commonwealth Development Corporation
Profund International, S.A.(FundaPro)
Acc.ion International
Accion Gateway Fund, LLC
Ramir Freitas OcampO
Ferber. Realty
Compama Boliviana de Inversiones S.A. (COBOnD
Roberto Capriles
Metrocity Investment
SIDI (Canada)
Jose Maria Ruisanchez
Gonzal1o Sanchez de Lozada
Julio LeOn Prado
Luis Eduardo SHes
Source:

BaJlCO

Solidario. S.A. 1001. Annual Repon. 4.
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CAJA LOS ANDES SHAREHOLDERS (2001)
Table 5.8
Percentaee of Shares I
46.69'
25.7

I Sbarebolder

ProCrMito NGO
lnternationale Micro Investitionen
AktiengeseUascbaft (IMl)
Andean Deve'}opment COliPoration (CAP)
Intern~tjonai Projekt Consuh (lPC)
Private investors
TOTAL

I

20 .0
1.0
6.4
99.79%

I

1

Source: Gaja Los Andes, FFP. 2001. Annual Report, 6; Gaja Los Andes.
www.caialosandes.coml/osandes./itm/ {Accessed 51JJI03/.
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FIE, SHAREHOLDERS (2001)
Table. 5.9
Shareholder
F1ENGO
Andean Development COIiJ)OFation (CM)
Swiss Development Corporation (COSUDE)
Interchurch Organization for Development
Cooperation (ICCO)
ADA / Roger Adams foundation
Raul Adler ~vlin
Peter Bnmhart Gassner
I
I M. Pilar Ramirez Muiio'z
Eames Carl Goran Nordgren

Percenta~e of

Shares
69.14
11.73
7.31
2.85

.

TOTAL

2.22
4.00
1.15
1.00
0.60
r

..,.

100%

Source: FIE. FfP. 2001. Annual Report, 18.

PRODEM SHAREHOLDERS (200t)
Table 5.10
Shareholder
PRODEMNGO
Eduardo, Bazoberry Otero
Edgar Millares Ardaya
Oscar Bazobeny Otero
Johnny Delgado Acnabal
Gonzalo Sanchez de Lozada
Carlos Gerke Mendieta
Fernando Anker Artea:ga
Jose Luis SiJ,vestro Arze
Ernest Brugger Alois
Empresa Bol. de Administracion
Sergio Prudencio Tardio
Marcelo Mallea CastHIo
Alfredo Otero Pizarro
Maria Elena Quereiazu Vidovic
Gonzalo Tezanos Pinto Guerra

TOTAL

Percentaee of Shares
80.95
3.03
2.62
2.02
2.021
2.02
1.01
1.01
1.01
1.01
lOI
0.67
0.67
0.34
0.34
0.26
J
ir~
100%

Source: PRODEM, FFP. 2001. Annual Report, J/.

COMMERlCIALlZATION: GOOD OR BAD?
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While this paper focuses on PRODEM, BancoSol, Caja Los Andes, and FIE, there are many
other microfinance institutions in Bolivia. Some have taken the FFP-route and await licenses from
the Superintendency. Others have decided to keep working as an NGO. These choices are mostly
based on the mission of the organization. As I have shown in ,the previous chapter, transformation
from N GO to commercial bank

0

r f ondo financiero privado (fFP) ism otivated Ib y m any factors.

Those that refuse the FFP model continue focusing on the soojal asp~ts of lending, including
economic and social ernpowennent Those who are for the FFP model do so on the grounds that this
model allows them to reach more people. Regardless of these differences both commetcial and non
commercial microfinance institutions agree that microcredit lending is a strategic and successful
model for sustainable development in Bolivia. How microfinance mstitutions qualify success is,
however, a different story.
Microfinance institutions that have not opted for commercialization are those based mainly in
rural or less populated areas. These institutions are those who have opted for the old definition of
success, that is, success not defined' by financial viabi'lity and commercialization.

Why?

What

advantages do noncommercial institu'tions claim to have? Microfinance institutions may decide not
to "go commercial" because of three reasons. First, for some microfinance institutions, expansion
would be impracticable and unattainab~e. The less populated areas do not offer enough clients to
consider opening new branches.

For this reason, commercialized mkrofinance institutions have

moved from rural areas to urban ones. Rural m icrocredit I nitiatives simply do not make enough
money.
Second, non-urban center populations tend to be among the poore.st of the poor.

Some

microcredit advocates, particularly Pirar Ramirez-founder of FIE-have shown a great concern
about providing capital access opportunities to the poor in

rural areas. The quickly declining

agricultural sector and the nearly non-existent mining sector have left the rural poor in dire straits.
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Providrng. them with capital and introducing new business initiatives with greater returns on capital is
essential.
The third and final reason is because microfinance institutions purposely choose to keep their
WOl'k

smaller in order offer services to their clients that commercialized institutions have cut. These

services are

bo~h

economic and! social in nature slllch as training about childcare and hygiene,

business management,

0

r literacy C oursework are perceived .a s essential parts

0

fa ssisting poverty

aUeviation efforts. Keeping their work sman has aJllowed tnicrofinance institutions to focus on the
social welfare as much as the economic welfare of its clients. These institutions assert that capital by
itself is nQt enough to alleviate poverty; thus they have incorporated a compulsory training program
i.nto their loan application.
Commercial microfin_3llce institutions cou.nter each of these arguments. First, in regards to
urban versus

rura~

microcredit programming, commercial microfinance institutions say it would have

been impossible to stay in the rural areas. In order to meet the needs of more clients and to achieve
sellf~sustainable, microcTedit

had to move to where the paying clients were. Microcredit had to move

into the neighborhoods and districts where microcredit would be most beneficial.
Second, commercial conglomerates argue that their founding NGOs still focus on microcredit
in the rural areas. [n fact the privatization of nllcrocredit has not only met the goal of reaching more
people i'n the city, but also it has enabled the maintenance of microcredit programs in the rural areas.
Non-governmental organizations can and do use the profits gained as shareholders in order to fund
unprofitable initiatives.

Third commercial microfinance institutions argue that the social programs were cut from the
loan process because they were perceived negatively by clients, did not prove beneficiaD to the clients
business vis-a-vis greater profits,

OF

beneficial ,to the institution vis-fa-vis improved repayment rate.

In a study done by Stephanie Small, Co.lby College graduate,

~t

is noted that the training program of

ProMujer in EI Alto is largely unproductive and inefficient. ProMu1er, a microcre<lit initiative that
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targets women, claims that its training program teaches women skills that w ill empower them to
become better, smarter mothers and vendors. Yet Small notes that U[e]mpowennent occurs with the
help of societal influences and opportunities, not manual pages.'>Q) Wo~en already know how to run
their businesses. In fact the requisite for taking out a first loan is proof of an existing business--a
business that was developed and maintained in the absence of training.
Muhammad Yunus, microcredit founder, also dislikes the idea of obligatory training,
however, based on different reasons. He states that compulsory training insinuates a paternalistic
attitude and infers that microentrepreneurs do not know have the necessary skills to run their business
well or invest the money wisely. He states,
Government decision-makers, many NGOs, and international consultants usually
start the work of poverty alleviation by launching very elaborate training programs.
They do this because they begin with the assumption that people are poor because
they lack skill...I firmly believe that all human beings have an innate skill. I call it
the survival skill. The fact that the poor are alive is clear proof of their ability. They
do not need us to teach them how to survive; they already know how to do this. 64
Yunus argues that people do not want training but rather money. He notes that they know
what to do with the money. The problem before microcredil was access not ability.
Pilar Ramirez, founder of FIE and an advocate of training, must consider that while
microentrepreneurs have not had access to capital, they have indeed been running successful
businesses for years prior to microcredit. Yes, one should place an importance on investing the
money in the business in order to see increased development, but Ramirez's insistence on a training
program wrongly assumes that most people do nol know how to run a business. Moreover the
attempt at social programming appears undesirable to clients and under compulsory circumstances is
ineffective. Moreover, the microfinance institutions that cling to the old definition of success also
have failed to prove training helps alleviate poverty.

63 Small, Stephanie. 1998. Missing from the Miracle: Microcredil and Urban Market Women in Bolivia. Senior Honors
Thesis, Colby College, 98.
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Most likely any social initiatives that incur further costs for microfinance institutions will not
be implemented--even those that might benefit the client. Most microfinance institutions argue that
social initiatives, especially training programs, are ineffective and therefore have had no qualm in
omitting them from the loan process.

Yet microfinance institutions have also made no further

anempted to propose alternative initiatives that complement the microcTedit effort. Perhaps
microfinance institutions lack ingenuity.

Although I suspect that it is something more basic.

Microfinance institutions do not want to invest more then the have to. They know that the poor take
what they can get-and all the poor get is microcredit .
CONCLUSION
There is no question that microfinance institutions are profitable. They have demonstrated
their viability and in comparison with other banks in Bolivia, they have even indicated greater
success. Many scholars point to the Bolivian case as a microfinance miracle. Not only has the
Bolivian model achieved sustainability and provoked competition, but also it is responsible for
reaching one·third of an estimated 600,000 microenterprises. 6S All of this "success," however, does
not meet the qualifications of what microcredit was originally proposed to do.

The fact that

microfinance institutions have been able to run good banks does not mean the poor are rising up out
of poverty. In the following chapter, I suggest a new definition of success--one that clearly indicates
that the social and economic conditions of the poor are truly improving.

Yunus, Muharmnad. 1999. Banker to the Poor: Micro-Lending and the Battle Against World Poverty. New York:
PublicAffairs,p. 141, 140.
6S Rhyne, Elisabeth and Roben Peck Christen. 1999. "Microfinance Enters the Market." Washington, DC: VSAlD. p. 4.
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CHAPTER SIX:
AN ALTERNATIVE DEFINITION OF SUCCESS
Undoubtedly microcredit is a booming business in Bolivia. The portfohos of microlending
institutions are constantly increasing.

The financial viabil'ity of microcredi.l, however, does not

inherently mean rnicrocredit is the best option for poverty allevijca.tion in BoJ,ivia.

This chapter

illustrates that microCledi,t in practice does Qot produce the results that microcredit in theory suggests.
It is important to raise these conceptual issues of microcredit and then relate them to evidence that
supports or rejec,ts the "goodness" of microCl1edit. This chapter concludes that microcredit bas.

no~

helped the poor but rathetr has shown signs of debilitating the poor further. First, I wi,U refute the
major assumption of the microcredit model, which says that microcredit is a development strategy for
the poor. Second, I will engage in a discussion about factors, [ believe, demonstrate advances towaro
poverty aUe.viation.
Microcredit Is Not For AU Poor

In the previous chapters, I demonstrated that microcredit is not a strategic

developmen~

modell for the poor but rather it is an economic exploit for the rich. If microcredit wants to reach the
poor then microfinance institutions

win

have to make a greater effort to expand their Iieach to the

poor. A study by Sergio Navajas et. al demonstr-ates that mic"rocredit targets people who are slightly
above and slightly below the poverty. That is, microcredil has not reached into populations where
the poorest of the poor live. The authors note !.hat the median level of poverty for the borrowers of

FIE and Caja Los Andes ciUSlered just above the poverty line, Banco Sol's at the poverty line, and
PRODEM's just below the poverty line. 66
When comparing these rnicrofinance institutions in their reach for the poorest clients in urban
areas, Caja Los Andes' portfolio only reached a bout 4 percent of the poorest and B ancoSol only
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about 5 percent of the poorest. FIE had the lowest share of the poorest, accounting for only 2 percent
of all its borrowers. PRODEM's count was considered for rural areas only. PRODEM served 32
percent of the poorest of the

poOr.
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Table 6.1 shows that the extremely poor predominate (although

not by much) in the rural areas, which further indicates the poorest do not benefit from microcredit.

Poverty in Bolivia, 1989-1995

Table 6.1

Urban 1989
Urban 1993
Urban 1995
Rural 1995

MILLIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
TOTAL
Extremelv
Poor
Poor
Non-Poor
I
1.3
3.4
0.2
1.9
3.7
2.1
1.4
0.2
".
~ 1.4
3.9
02
2.3
2.8
.4
0.3
2.1

Source: Adopted from Paul Mosley's "MicTojinance and Poverty: Bolivia Case Study"
Revised final drafl. Mav 1999.

Penetrating 'the poorest clients also is closely correlated with the microlending model type.
As mentioned earlier, individlllal loans exclude the poorest clients from receiving credit because they
have

FlO collatera~

to offer. Caja Los Andes and FIE, the new lenders that issue only the individual

loans, had less them 1 percent of the poorest bouseholds in their portfolios. BancoSol, which is
known for its solidarity model served about 3 percent of the poorest household. PRODEM's rural
offices on the outskirts of La Paz reached only about 2 percent of the poorest households. 68 This data
supports my earlier conclusion that microcredit is for some and not for others. The move towards
strict indivi:dl!lal lending means that micFOfinance institutions consider the poorest of the poor as not
good enough for microcre<Ht. The cost of lending to these groups is too great. The poorest Bolivians
are excluded from "development."

Navajas et a!. 2002. "Microcredil and the Poorest of the Poor in Bolivia" in Manfred Zeller and Rich>ard L. Meyers,
Eds. The Triangle of Microfinance: Financial Sustainability. Outreach. and Impact. Baltimore: John Hopkins University
Press. p. 162-163.

66

61
611

Ibid, 164-165.
Ibid, 168.

82

It is argued that clients who are very poor are not the most desirable in order to reach
microfinance profitability. The poorest in Bolivia have higher delinquency rates and are most likely
to become indebted.

So this means that microcredit must be selective in their client choice,

otherwise it fails to profit. As of yet, the microcredit development model has not addressed this
problem. Although studies point to microcredit as being for some of the poor and not all, no other
development model has been proposed to· reach those who are excluded from microcredit.

If

microcredit is to help the poor, then it should help the an IJhe poor. If the Bolivian model cannot
meet this task whi1le maintaining sustainabHity then other approaches must be considered!.

It appears that some microfinance, institutions are trying to make a gIieater effort to reach the
rural poor. Asotin reports that in December 200 I, Caja Los Andes had expanded its reach to rural
Bolivia, with its rural offices accounting for more branches than its urban ones.

Urban

V5.

Rural Gwgrapbical OutTeacb
Table 6.2

MICROFINANCE INSTITUTION

Location
Urban
Rural

I Source:
II

Banco Solidario

CaJa Los Andes

FIE

30
4

13
14

16
0

I

PRODEM
' 22
40

ASOF/N 2002. Balances Generales y Estados de ReslJ/tados par 10 Gestion
2002. Unpublished report.

This does not mean, however, that Caja Los Andes is reaching the poorest in these areas. In fact
their portfolio notes that the rural portfolio "reflects the institutions focus on the agriculture and
livestock" oriented clients. In rural BoJ,ivia, these clients are probably not the poorest clients. Those
Composition ,of Caja Los Andes' Rural Portfolio
that are most likely to be very poor are ,thosrU~.:lfrvice, commercial, and manufacturing sectors
because they are isolated

r produc;tivity.
I

• Agriculture
• Commercial
.Senice
• Manufacture
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Source: Coja Los Andes. 2001. Annual Report. 19.

Microcredit Does Not Promote Women Empowennent
Microcredit theory has always claimed to be the melmS for women empowennent.
Empowerment can be defined as greater independence and puning the tools for improvement directly

in the hands of women. Microcredit theory claims that microcredit has meant good things for
Boliv~an

women. Bolivian women a[e glad for the opportunity to be in charge of their fmances.

Before microcredit, women got loans from loan sharks at exorbitant interest rates, some as high as
20% per month. Microcredit access gave them new independence and provided capital tbroogh
institutions, which was an important step towards recognizing !.he role women

p~ay

in the economy.

For the first time in Boliv,ian history, women became strategic fmancial actors.
So are any of the above claims true? In fact, many of them are. Women were happy to be
candidates of microcredit. Microfinance institutions have the testimonials to prove it. Women did
pay very high interest rates to loan sharks, because there were no other credit options. What is ·not
true. however, is that women have achieved greater independence. Women have only shifted ,their
dependence from one loan shark to another. Women use microcredit to survive. That means without
microcredit they may be ruined. Microcredit has not challenged arguments of dependency, yet it has
embraced

i~

for its own. Essentially women moved from one loan shark that was an indi,viduatl Ito

another that is a group of foreign ftrms. This obviously does not translate into greater lindependence.
Microcredlit has also moved away from its focus on women. For the sake of competition,
microcredit is offering money to any cliieot that has the necessary credentials to pay the loan bank.
Microfinance instihJtion portfolio make-up illustIrates 'that microcredit no longer targets women for

Caja Los Andes Portfolio
Gender Distribution, 2001
Table 6.4

1°>kO
• Women I

PRODEM Portfolio Gender
Distribution, 2002
Table 6.5

84
1°>kO
• Women I

the sake of empowerment. Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 6.6 express that this is the case for Caja Los Andes,
FIE, and PRODEM, Data was not available for BancoSol.
Source: Coja Los Andes. 1001. Annual Report, 21.

.source." Jorge Guzman Vargas. JQ/7Uary 2/.2003.
Personallme",iew, PROD£M La Paz, Bolivia.

FIE Portfolio Gender
Distributio~ 2001
Table 6.6

"...---

~~:~
t~-'·'
J~

.'

~-~

ID~. I
• WOOleD j

Source: FIE. 2001. An1TUal Report, 37.

Microcredit May Not Always Target the Poor

N'oie: In PRODEM"s portfolio, men and women
account for 63.18% and 36.19%, respectively of
the dollar total. This further demonstrates that men
are issued bigger loans than women are. The same

conditions apply to FIE's portfolio as well. Men
There has been some speculation that mlcr and women account for 58.08% and 41.92%,
respectively of the dollar total of the portfolio.

microcredit is shifting from its "micro" status
Microfinance institutions refute this argument, stating that the reason why loans are getting larger is
because clients are becoming more successful, enabling them to take out larger loans. During my
field research, there was not sufficient information to attest to this fact. The only answer that I did
get was that it would be difficult to document if such an occurrence, because not all clients take out
new loans directly after the repayment of the first. Some clients wait months and even years to take
out a bigger lOaF}.
During my interviews with the Garron family, many of the family members expr:essecl their
doubt in microfinance. They believed that microfinance was taking over the banking industry and
that iF! the future, microfinan_ce institutions would no longer offer "micro" credit. It is 'true that
microfinance have become competitive with traditional banks. Yet there is 00 evidence as of yet that
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microfinance institutions are placing a greater emphasis on attracting ''big'' borrowers.

While

average loan sizes are getting larger each year, there still is no significant number of big loans (over
$5,000).
An Alternative Defin.ition of Success

Defining microcredit success as profitability has become detrimental to the poor.

By

claiming microfinance a success because of financial indicators in an annual report, microcredit has
missed the point.

Microcredit cannot prove that the microborrowers are less poor.

One of my

biggest frustrations during my field work in Bolivia was the fact that microfinance institutions could
not produce impact studies of microcredit on the client. Time after time, USAID officials, PRODEM
financial ,analysts, BancoSol managers, among

others would tell me that there were no impact

studies. Maria Elena Querejazu, who works at PRODEM NGO and holds shares in PRODEM FFP,
tolld me outright that impact studies do not explain much a bout the impact of rnicrocredit on the
client, because so many other factors can influence a client's economic success or failure. I tend to
agree with this statement, however, I also think that it is worth a try. If microfinance institutions
really cared about ma:king a difference in the lives of the poor, then they would demand evidence
saying so. However, mjcrofinance institutions are not really interested in the client, except in hislher
ability to pay back a loan.
I am interested in the success of the Bolivian poor. I want to know ifmicrocredit is harming
or helping the poor.

WhHe

~

speculate throughout my study that microcredit is ineffective in

alleviating poverty, I am interested to know how rnicrocredit affects clients throughout.

In my

interview with Blanca Chiquinia, an artisan vendor, I discovered that micTocredit did not help her
build her business. 69 Blanca told me that in order to pay back the loan at such high interest rates, she
actually had to downsize her enterprise. Besides that, Blanca C o·signed for another women who

6~ Chiquinia, Blanca. January 9, 2003. Personallnlerview. La paz.. Bolivia.
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defaulted on her loan, and will soon face legal penalties for not stepping in on her friend's behalf. Is
tbis the same story of many rnicrocredit clients?

In ani nterview with Gabriela A ramayo Carrasco, assistant tot he Commercial Manager, I
asked Gabriela if there was any kind of follow-up on the chent. She responded, no there was not. I
then asked ber if it was correct to assume that clients who ask for the second and third loan may not
be at all capable of paying it back. She responded, "Yes. Sometimes the second and third loans are
not a true representation of business growth, and the loans get paid back but maybe just barely.,,7o
There seems to be a lot of potential for things to go wrong.
How do we know that the needs of the poor are being met'? Microfinance institutions say that
the fact that clients have been able to take out larger loans attests to this fact.

Microfinance

institutions say that microcredit helps the poor get rich. Yet these are theoretical assumptions. A real
measure of poverty alleviation must concretely indicate that the social and economic plight of the
poor has improved. An indicator that confinns poverty alleviation is basically a better standard of
living. Microfinance institutions could claim success

if their clients lived

in an alley and now reside

if there

clients did not have access

in a decent home. Microfinance institutions could claim success

to potable water or electricity and now they do. Success requires higher standards of education for
the poor and steady jobs with social welfare benefits such as health.

Poverty alleviation

demonstrated that some of these basic needs are being met. Just because microfinance institutions
are getting rich does not mean the poor are too. Creating linkages between these two ideas is absurd.
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Aramayo Carrasco, Gabriela lanuary 21, 2003. Personal Interview. Caja Los Andes. La Paz, Bolivia
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CONCLUSION
Development is most definitely a concept Bolivia has struggled with over the past 30 years.
The different actors that bave been involved in defining development, including the Bolivian
government foreign governments, and

"non~state"

entities, have all wrestled with defining

development. However, development is always a relative term, because it means development for
some and not. for others. Banzer's attempt to "develop" the nation was largely defined by giving
concessions to the elite.

paz's attempt to "develop" the nation has resulted in monopolistic

maneuvering ofpri,vate, foreign investors in B olivia's public sectors. Each oft hese development
plans have excluded the poor from reaping any benefits from the nations "development"
Microcredit-Bolivia's newest development plan-predominates the scene in the 21 st
century. International organizations claim that microcredit is the answer for the poor in developing
nations. Microcredit theory, however, has failed to provide evidence that the poor actually feel the
effects of poverty alleviation by having access to credit Even though clients do take advantage of
the credit provided, they do so because it is the only option offered to them. Without access

to

other

types of resources. the Bolivian poor have been forced to make do with microcredit.
What the Bolivian poor need are jobs and not credit. Microcredit is not going to tum the
poor Bolivian into a small industrialists. It is unrealistic to believe that microcredit is going to
relieve poverty. Moreover rnicrocredit is not going to be the means in which Bolivia achieves overall
economic development There are many social and economic constraints on the Bolivian poor that
microcredit will never address. Giving a poor person a loan does not mean that their lives are going
to improve in all areas. The majority of Bolivians still live under poor conditions. Economic
distribution is still concentrated in the hands of the top 20 percent of the popolation. Microcredit will
never address these types of inequalities.

It may however exacerbate the situation as the poor

essentially give money to the rich by taking loans at high interest rates.

For future studies on Bolivia's microcredit model, I would like to carry out an investigation
regarding the impact of microcredit on the clients. Even though microfinance institutions publish
"success" stories in their annual reports, I highly doubt that this is the same story of all Bolivian
poor.
I question the motives of international organizations desire to invest in Bolivia. While the

Bolivian foreign debt is astronomically high and investors seem interested in getting their money
back, I believe that investors truly just want to keep Bolivia dependent foreign aid. The Bolivian
government has cut social spending and given NGOs free reign to initiate their own social programs.
This points to the fact hat Bolivia has become even more dependent on foreign actors then ever
before. Furthennore it is not only is the Bolivian government that has become dependent on foreign
aid, but also Bolivians. Bolivia's dependency on foreign actors is penetrating into even the smallest
units of society.

Microcredit merely attests to the fact that international actors want to replicate

Bolivia's national dependency on aid at the individual level. Microcredit makes the poor dependent
on loans for "development" just as the Bolivian nation depends on aid for development. This kind of
dependency creates a vicious cycle, and unfortunately I do not see Bolivia leaving it anytime soon.
Bolivia must anticipate its future.

For years it has been blatantly obvious that this kind of

dependency has not resulted in true development for Bolivia.
interested in Bolivian development.

International investors are not

So if Bolivia seeks true development it must propose an

alternative.
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